Who in Indiana is in charge of drug commerce? The Indiana Board of Pharmacy and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.) are in charge of all drug commerce in Indiana. Drug commerce is defined as manufacturing, distributing or dispensing controlled substances (drugs). Anyone who wishes to engage the public in drug commerce within Indiana is required to get these federal and state agencies' permission in order to legally operate. These agencies perform the same functions as each other, but for different sovereigns.
The pharmacy board works for the Governor of Indiana. Its sovereign is the Indiana legislature. The D.E.A. works for the U.S. Attorney General. Its sovereign is Congress.
Because of the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. constitution, the D.E.A. has superior regulatory power over that of the state pharmacy board. Conversely, because of the territoriality of criminal jurisdiction, Indiana has exclusive authority to adjudicate most drug crimes that occur within Indiana. One exception to this rule is that it is a U.S. drug crime to mail illicit drugs using the U.S. Postal Service, which violates Congress' Postal Privilege.
What are these agencies' powers? The Indiana pharmacy board and the D.E.A. share two powers, called police powers. The word “control” in the Controlled Substances Act is a reference to these police powers. These two police powers are called regulation and criminal prohibition. Regulation operates under the judicial authority called equity. Prohibition operates under the judicial power called law.
Regulation is to adjudicate who may engage the American public in some activity, such as commerce. Prohibition is to outlaw people's crimes. Regulation operates in administrative courts within the executive branch using non-criminal administrative law. Criminal prohibition operates solely in judicial courts and solely against criminal cases involving injury to other people.
So commerce is regulated and crime is prohibited. As separate constitutional concepts, they are treated in different branches of government, using different processes, and applying different judicial powers to different kinds of persons over different kinds of rights.
This belies that there is a difference between commerce and crimes, which difference is self-evident by their respective meanings and word-use in American constitutions. This belies that drug commerce is not drug crime. Drug commerce is to make or sell drugs. A drug crime is to intentionally (or wantonly) injure someone while engaged in drug use or commerce.
Regulators of the Indiana pharmacy board and the D.E.A. exercise the above two mentioned police powers. They regulate all drug commerce using their powers of equity, such as confiscation and injunction, and they can exercise their arrest powers against criminals, who they have probable cause to believe have committed crimes against other people.
Other law enforcers may help these agencies with their regulatory functions over drug commerce, such as witnessing and ticketing regulatory infractions. In contrast, agents of the pharmacy board and the D.E.A. share equal power with other law enforcers over crimes, including drug crimes.
So, all government officials and defense attorneys must know the difference between commerce and crime, and the difference between drug commerce and drug crime, so as to know if certain behavior is to be criminally prosecuted in the judicial branch or is regulated in the executive branch.
Almost all government officials and defense attorneys mistake drug commerce with drug crime. That is, they think selling disfavored drugs is a crime. This is a mistake of law. Crimes and torts are naturally defined in a republic, not artificially defined by a legislature. Crimes and torts are physical violations of other people's natural rights. Drug commerce is not.
Thus, one cannot commit a crime in Indiana without harming someone else. To harm someone else is a natural wrong. In general, unintentional natural wrongs are called torts and intentional natural wrongs are called crimes. Both terms are naturally defined as injurious behavior. Within America's fifty states, we have natural rights to do anything – at least privately – except for natural wrongs.
And so to suggest that the concepts of commerce and crime are the same is to misunderstand and misrepresent law. To willfully misrepresent law is to commit fraud. Anyone who believes that drug commerce is drug crime, which is not true because they are separate concepts, is a victim of someone's fraud (and their own gullibility).
Cannot the legislature declare certain behavior to be crimes, such as unwanted drug dealing? No. Think about this: If the legislature could define crime, then 1) it could declare non-crimes (such as walking or eating) to be crimes, 2) it could declare certain crimes (such as theft and murder) to be non-crimes, and 3) it could grant its members power to commit crimes with impunity. In other words, if a republican legislature could define what is and is not criminal, then it could act like a king, which is not allowed in a republic.
So, crime is not a creation of republican legislatures, but is defined by a higher and more natural authority than any legislature or king, i.e. Nature. Under our republican form of government, crime is defined by the political laws of Nature as a natural wrong. A natural wrong is malum in se – or wrong by its injurious nature – which is behavior that violates the natural rights of other people. So a crime is a natural wrong, which is the opposite of a natural right.
Because Nature defines the natural rights and wrongs of natural flesh-and-blood persons (called individuals), then republican legislatures have absolutely no authority over the natural rights and wrongs of these natural persons, operating in their natural capacities. Instead, legislatures define the artificial legal rights and wrongs of all artificial entities that they created and recognize, such as all forms of business, all foreigners, and all license holders.
These artificial entities operate by a legislature's permission, under the judicial authority of equity. Individuals who have not entered this artificial legislative jurisdiction remain free of the legislature under law. These free individuals subject themselves to the law jurisdiction of government – which enforces natural law – only when they commit torts and crimes.
So in the fifty United States, individuals are born and remain free of government 1) unless they consent to the equity jurisdiction of legislatures by, for instance, entering commerce, or 2) unless they violate a mandatory natural law by harming someone else. In their commercial capacities, they operate in equity. In their naturally right and wrong capacities, individuals operate at law.
The role of equity is 1) to adjudicate disputes within the judicial branch between artificial entities, such as two businesses, and 2) to determine these artificial entities' legal rights and duties using administrative law in the executive branch. Specifically with regard to drugs, the role of equity is 1) to adjudicate cases (disputes) within the judicial branch involving drugs (such as a dispute between drug dealers), and 2) to adjudicate all drug dealers' legal rights to make and sell drugs using administrative law courts in the executive branch.
In contrast, America's republican legislatures have no equitable authority over flesh-and-blood individuals 1) when these persons are not operating in an artificial regulated status, such as are all licensees, foreigners and forms of business, and 2) who have not consented to governments' equitable powers. Thus republican legislatures have no power to define individuals' natural rights and wrongs (crimes), to redefine the criminal jurisdiction of judicial courts over injury, or to declare some commerce to be a crime, which would be to violate the separate meanings of commerce and crime in our constitutions.
Republican legislatures have power only to say what is right and wrong for the artificial persons that they regulate, such as foreigners, forms of business and license holders. What legislatures declare to be wrong for these artificial persons is called malum prohibita. These declarations do not apply to individuals operating in their natural capacities.
Plus, these declarations have no criminal authority because they are enforced under non-criminal equity, instead of under criminal law. Legislatures do not have authority to say what is right and wrong for natural persons, whose political morality – that is, what is right and wrong among individuals in a polity (or organized community) – is defined by natural law as malum in se.
For example, a legislature has authority to sanction automobile drivers for driving over speed limits, but it has no authority to sanction passengers for anything. This is because driving is a legislative privilege that operates under regulation, enforced under non-criminal equity. In contrast, just sitting as a passenger is the exercise of a natural right, subject only 1) to one's physical and political duties to Nature, and 2) to one's contractual duties to the driver, for example not to smoke.
Both the driver and his passengers are subject to Nature's mandatory prohibition against harming other people, and to their physical duties to Nature, such as eating and sleeping. However, only the driver owes duties to the legislature. Only the driver is subject to legislative malum prohibita, such as prohibitions against driving too fast or against texting while driving. This is because only the driver has consented to the legislature's authority over roads, cars and driving.
In summary, crime, which is malum in se (wrong by it injurious nature), is defined or prohibited by natural law in the criminal law jurisdiction. In contrast, regulatory infractions, which are malum prohibita, are prohibited by legislative positive law and are enforced against artificial persons using administrative law under equity.
Because natural law proscribes (prohibits) crime, then republican legislatures do not legislate crimes, but instead merely prescribe (write down) what crimes that Nature proscribes. Nature's prohibitions, i.e., malum in se, operates upon natural persons in the criminal law jurisdiction of the judicial branch, while legislatures' prohibitions, i.e., malum prohibita, operate upon artificial persons who have consented to the equity jurisdiction and its administrative law.
How do these agencies operate? The Indiana pharmacy board and the D.E.A. are to apply their regulatory powers to drug commerce and to apply their prohibitory powers to drug crimes. They apply their regulatory powers under equity in the executive branch and they apply their criminal powers under law in the judicial branch.
Their regulatory powers include the power to confiscate unwanted commercial property (and have it forfeited), the power to order drug makers and sellers to operate a certain way (called specific performance), and the power to enjoin unwanted drug dealing. Their prohibitory powers include the powers to arrest and witness people for their drug crimes, which involve injury.
Thus, these agencies' law enforcers (who have authority to carry guns), as well as other law enforcers who support them, must know the differences between commerce and crime to do their jobs properly. The war on drugs is the result of not knowing the difference between commerce and crime, and not keeping governments' respective jurisdictions over commerce and crime separate.
All drug dealing is commerce, which is subject to regulation and malum prohibita in the executive branch. Because of the Separation of Powers Doctrine in state and U.S. constitutions, this drug dealing is not subject to criminal prohibition as malum in se in the judicial branch.
The administrative law courts of the Indiana pharmacy board and the D.E.A. determine who may make and sell drugs. They license drug dealers that meet their standards. They may enjoin drug dealers who do not register with them, or who do not meet their standards. These administrative injunctions may be enforced by judicial injunctions, using judicial courts' contempt powers. This is how the regulatory process works. It is non-criminal.
Do these agencies regulate unwanted drug commerce, which we call drug dealing? Yes. The police power of regulation – as opposed to criminal prohibition – applies to all commerce that is not criminal, i.e., injurious. Only the commerce in slaves (including human trafficking) is criminal because it violates its victims' natural rights of liberty and political equality, which drug commerce does not.
Thus, all commerce other than slavery is lawful – meaning non-criminal – and all commerce other than slavery is subject to regulation and is not subject to criminal law. So, drug commerce is categorically subject to regulation, not criminal prohibition, under the republican form of government.
Unwanted drug dealing is lawful (non-criminal) and is not subject to judicial courts for two reasons. First, judicial courts have original jurisdiction only over cases that involve injury, including criminal cases. Second, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment say that people who make and sell drugs – as a commercial class – are to be treated the same. This same treatment is called administrative due process.
Thus, both desired and undesired drug dealers are to be treated to the same non-criminal administrative process to adjudicate their rights to make and sell drugs. And thus, the issue of who may make drugs and sell them to the public is an administrative determination, not a judicial (justiciable) one. Who may make and / or sell drugs is subject to administrative law courts, and not to criminal law courts.
Do these agencies (and other law enforcers) have power over drug possession? No. These agencies, and law enforcers who support them, have only two powers: the power to regulate drug commerce and the power to arrest and be witnesses against criminals. By definition, people who merely possess property are not criminals
Property possession within America's republics is not a crime. It is a natural right. This natural right is codified at Article I, Section 1 of the Indiana constitution (1816) and in all state and U.S. Controlled Substances Acts. All of these acts literally say that drug users are not subject to regulation and may “lawfully possess” drugs for their own use and the use of their households. Thus, drug possession is a natural right because it is not subject to either police power: regulation or prohibition.
In summary, the powers of the Indiana pharmacy board and the D.E.A. within Indiana are 1) to regulate all drug commerce using non-criminal administrative law courts in the executive branch, which can enjoin unwanted drug dealing, and 2) to arrest all drug criminals whose drug-related behavior injures other people. Neither the U.S. nor Indiana governments may exercise any police power within Indiana over individual drug possession.
Do not Indiana's drug laws criminally prohibit drug possession and drug dealing? No. This is because Indiana's legislature does not have authority 1) to criminalize the natural right of drug possession, 2) to criminalize the legal right of drug dealing, which it instead regulates, or 3) to expand the criminal jurisdiction of judicial courts, which gain their powers from constitutions – not legislatures.
Consequently, neither the Indiana nor U.S. Controlled Substances Acts prohibit nor make unlawful (criminal) drug possession or dealing within Indiana, which requires a constitutional amendment. Instead, the acts only makes unwanted drug dealing illegal, or malum prohibita, subject to being enjoined.
To be unlawful is to be tortious or criminal, and thus triable in a judicial court. It is to violate natural political law. In contrast, to be illegal is to violate the positive law of a legislative sovereign.
Thus, to be unlawful (or malum in se) is to be treated judicially. To be illegal (or malum prohibita) is to be treated administratively in the executive branch. This is the consequence of our constitutions separating the concepts of commerce from crime, and of equity from law.
Instead of making these separations obvious, as they should, Indiana's drug statutes willfully misrepresent law to you and me by calling drug possession and dealing “misdemeanors” and “felonies,” as if labeling behavior makes it criminal. For example, if the Indiana legislature called eating a sandwich or taking a bus to work “misdemeanors” or “felonies,” would that make this behavior criminal and subject to incarceration? No.
This is (again) because crimes are not defined by legislatures, but are only written down by them. Crimes are naturally defined by a higher authority than legislatures, as violations of someone else's natural rights. (Crimes are not violations of legal rights granted by a legislature or of bargained-for contractual rights.) Republican legislatures have no authority to criminally proscribe (prohibit) behavior. They have power only to prescribe (write down) wrongful behavior that Nature has already proscribed for her natural persons.
So the Indiana legislature has no power to criminally prohibit drug possession or dealing because this behavior – by its nonviolent nature – is not criminal behavior, which is defined to be injurious. In other words, determining who belongs in jail is not our legislature's call. Criminals are defined by natural political law.
Because the Indiana legislature does not have the constitutional power to “prohibit” drugs or make them “unlawful,” then instead it calls drug possession and dealing “misdemeanors” and “felonies,” as if to do so makes it so. Because drug possession and dealing are not misdemeanors or felonies as the Indiana and U.S. constitutions secure meaning to these words, then these are misrepresentations of law that were willfully created by the statutes' writers.
Heretofore defense attorneys have committed mistakes of law by not seeing through this legislative fraud. They have committed mistakes of law by assuming powers not granted to republican legislatures, by not discerning the legal rights that are owed to all drug dealers, and by not discerning the natural rights of drug users that are reserved within drug statutes. Albeit obscured, these natural and legal rights are embedded in drug statutes so that they will be constitutional.
That these drug statutes are torturedly-written is our first hint that they are fraudulent. This is because there is absolutely no logical (or moral) reason for statutes either 1) not to represent law correctly or 2) to at all be unclear, which are both characteristics of America's Controlled Substances Acts. So, to understand the drug war as a fraud, one begins by reading and understanding the statutes, which have misled government officials as to their proper powers and procedures.
Do you have anything else that is relevant to mention? Yes. What is not only relevant but essential to know, and what has essentially not been taught to most of us, is 1) that there are two and only two forms of government in this universe, i.e. republican and non-republican, but 2) that both forms of government are authorized by the U.S. constitution and operate simultaneously over separate territories and subject matter within the United States. Let me reiterate this more simply: both the republican form of government and the non-republican form of government simultaneously operate within this country.
Because Congress must guarantee the republican form of government to the states, which are themselves republics, then it must legislate as a republic toward the states. As republics, Congress and the states regulate both commerce and foreigners, and they prohibit crime, using the same natural definition of crime, involving injury to a right.
However, Congress need not legislate over the federal areas as a republic. These federal areas, which are defined at 8 United States Code 7, include the District of Columbia, the federal territories, the federal areas within the states, all navigable waterways including coastlines, and all boats, airplanes and spaceships registered to the United States. In these areas, Congress defines everyone's duties and rights as would a king, without reference to rights and wrongs according to the political laws of Nature.
Thus, in these federal areas, Congress determines everyone's right to possess drugs as well as everyone's right to be deal drugs. And thus, when Americans enter the District of Columbia or a ship or an airplane, they enter the jurisdiction of a non-republican form of government – in essence a dictatorship – where all their rights are determined by Congress.
Given this power over the federal areas, Congress grants the legal right of drug possession there. Thus, no one is to be arrested for drug possession in the federal areas, including on ships and in airplanes. However, Congress criminally prohibits unwanted drug dealing in the federal areas. The D.E.A. licenses favored kinds of drug commerce in the federal areas by doctors, pharmacists and delivery companies, yet it criminally prohibits unlicensed drug dealing by lowly street dealers and international drug traffickers.
So Congress legitimately uses its non-republican powers over the federal areas to criminally prohibit international drug trafficking. And so, it is only in the federal areas that unlicensed drug commerce is criminally prohibited. Elsewhere within the United States, unlicensed drug commerce is regulated and subject to injunction as malum prohibita.
Which alerts us to the biggest criminal elements of the war on drugs: 1) that not only do state prosecutors falsely enforce state drug laws using courts in the judicial branch instead of administrative law courts in the executive branch, but also 2) U.S. prosecutors have been applying criminal legislation that Congress legislated for the federal areas in false criminal prosecutions against drug dealers within the states, who are instead to be non-criminally regulated.
This means that most drug prosecutions within the United States during the past 50 years have been based on misrepresentations of law, if not fraud, toward state judicial and U.S. Article III courts, which have no subject matter jurisdiction over drug possession or dealing. Both state and federal drug prosecutions within the states have been unlawful because regulation – and not criminal prohibition – applies to all unlicensed intrastate and interstate drug dealing. U.S. prosecutions have been doubly culpable because U.S. attorneys have been applying criminal law legislated for Article I courts in the federal areas to subject matter within the states that is not even judicial.
False state prosecutions have been unlawful (that is, tortious or criminal) because unwanted drug dealing is subject to administrative law. U.S. prosecutions in Article III courts have been unlawful because all drug-dealing prosecutions belong in Article I legislative courts, applicable only to unwanted drug dealing within the federal areas.
Thus, barring the commission of real crime, every time we have witnessed a drug prosecution in a state judicial court or in an U.S. Article III court, we have witnessed an unintentional tort or an intentional crime, which is to violate someone else's natural rights without lawful authority. The war on drugs reflects a total breakdown in the numerous separations of power that are guaranteed to individuals under a republican form of government. To condemn this false practice is to first understand it, as the reader now has every means (and no excuses but) to do.
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