Notice and Demand
to City of Indianapolis, Marion County,
​Indiana and United States Officials

          On or about Thursday March 15, 2018 this 9-page Notice and Demand 1) was recorded in the Office of the Recorder, Marion County, Indiana, and 2) was, for purposes of recording, mailed with $31.50 payment to the DC Office of the Recorder of Deeds, 1101 4th Street SW, Suite 500W, Washington DC 20024. This document is also published at http://www.drugsarelegal.com/notice-and-demand.html

          On or about Saturday March 17, 2018 copies of this Notice and Demand were mailed to the following City of Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana and U.S. government officials using Certified U.S. Mail, Return Receipt Requested.

Indianapolis, Marion County and Indiana officials
Mr. John Layton, Marion County Sheriff, 40 S. Alabama Street, Indianapolis, IN 46204
Mr. Bryan Roach, Chief of Police, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, 50 N. Alabama Street, Indianapolis, IN 46204
Mr. Terry Curry, Marion County Prosecutor, 251 E. Ohio Street, Suite 160, Indianapolis, IN 46204
Mr. Joe Hogsett, Mayor, City of Indianapolis, 2501 City-County Building, 200 E. Washington Street, Indianapolis, IN 46204
Mr. Eric Holcomb, Governor of Indiana, Office of the Governor, State House, Indianapolis, IN 46204-2797
​Mr. Curtis Hill, Attorney General of Indiana, Office of the Indiana Attorney General, Statehouse, Indianapolis, IN 46204
Ms. Winnie Landis, President, Indiana Board of Pharmacy, 402 W. Washington Street, Room W072, Indianapolis, IN 46204

U.S. officials
President Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, The White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20500
General Jeff Sessions, United States Attorney General, The United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20530-0001
Mr. Josh Minkler, United States Attorney, United States Attorneys Office, 10 W. Market Street, Suite 2100, Indianapolis, IN 46204
U.S. Marshall for the Southern District of Indiana, U.S. Marshall's Service, 46 E. Ohio Street, #179, Indianapolis, IN 46204
Director, Drug Enforcement Administration, 575 N. Pennsylvania Street, Suite 408, Indianapolis, IN 46204

​This is a Notice to City of Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana and U.S. Officials who are responsible for the wrongful enforcement of Indiana and U.S. drug statutes within Indiana under false color of law, and a Demand upon these Officials that they enforce Indiana and U.S. drug statutes lawfully as described hereunder. 

This Notice and Demand serves to create a record of evidence:

1) that the Officials hereto have been shown and explained the law in Indiana with regard to controlled substances (herein also referred to as drugs),
2) that these Officials have been shown and explained their lawful duty to stop the false enforcement of Indiana and U.S. drug statutes in Indiana, and to stop their false representation of criminal and administrative law with regard to drugs, and
3) that these Officials' failure or omission to stop said false enforcement of drug statutes and to stop said misrepresentation of law is to knowingly, willfully and intentionally act under false and fraudulent color of law, for which they would have no immunity.

To properly enforce and defend Indiana and U.S. drug statutes is:

1) for U.S., Indiana and local law enforcers (regulators, police officers and prosecutors) to respect the codified natural rights of drug possession in natural persons within the state republic,
2) for U.S. and Indiana regulators, respectively in the Indiana Board of Pharmacy and the Drug Enforcement Administration, to regulate all drug commerce (also referred to as drug dealing) within Indiana and between Indiana and other states,
3) for U.S. law enforcers (agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. attorneys) to criminally sanction only drug commerce in the federal areas, defined at 8 USC 7, and
4) for Indiana prosecutors (with the help of other law enforcers) to prosecute all malum in se crimes in Indiana that involve drugs, for example, a) acquiring drugs using force, theft or fraud, or b) selling counterfeit or contaminated drugs, which are real drug crimes.

In summary, the following will show:

1) that individuals have a codified natural right in Indiana to acquire (from whomever they wish), possess and privately use drugs;
2) that agents of the Indiana Board of Pharmacy and of the Drug Enforcement Administration, who have primary jurisdiction over drugs in Indiana, have authority only to regulate drug commerce, which is subject only to state and U.S. equitable remedies of investigation, confiscation (and forfeiture), specific performance, and injunction;
3) that drug dealing (but not individual drug possession) is criminally prohibited in the federal areas, including America's coastlines, navigable waterways, and U.S. registered ships and aircraft, which are subject to Congress' plenary authority;
4) that crime in Indiana is malum in se whether or not the crime involves drugs, and
5) that the Indiana and U.S. Controlled Substances Acts secure individuals' natural right to possess controlled substances and provide due process and equal protection to all drug dealers, but that these acts are not properly enforced in Indiana by the Officials hereto so as to secure these natural and legal rights.

Further and more specifically, Notice about the laws regarding controlled substances (drugs) in Indiana is hereby provided to the Officials hereto:

• that within Indiana individual drug possession and commercial drug possession (possession of property with the intent to sell it) is lawful, and is not subject to the criminal law jurisdiction of Indiana judicial courts and of U.S. Article III courts, because the law jurisdiction, which possesses the only criminal authority in Indiana, has original, subject matter jurisdiction only over cases or controversies (see Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. constitution; Article I, Sections 5, 19 and 20 of the Indiana constitution (1851); I.C. 33-28-1-2 and I.C. 33-29-1-1.5), which are malum in se, such that they cause injury to one's person, property or reputation in order to invoke a court's subject matter jurisdiction (see Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana constitution (1851));

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• that what is lawful is defined by the law jurisdiction of Indiana judicial courts and of U.S. Article III courts as respectively established by Article IV, Section 1 of the Indiana constitution (1816) and Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. constitution; that property lawfully possessed in Indiana is property that is consensually acquired without force, theft or fraud from any source that already lawfully possesses it; that what is unlawful, tortious or criminal is to cause injury to the person, property or reputation of any other person;

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• that individual and commercial drug possession within Indiana is lawful, and is not criminally prohibited by the law jurisdiction of judicial courts, because individuals have a natural, inherent and unalienable right to acquire, possess and defend property within Indiana (see Article I, Section 1 of the Indiana constitution (1816)); that this natural right is codified for inhabitants and visitors of Indiana in the Indiana Controlled Substances Act at IC 35-48-3-3(e), as read in conjunction with IC 35-48-1-27, and is codified in the U.S. Controlled Substances Act at 21 USC 822(c), as read in conjunction with 21 USC 802(27), such that individuals may “lawfully possess” drugs for their own use and the use of the households; that said statutes provide an affirmative defense under Trial Rule 8 to criminal prosecutions for drug possession, if the defense is timely asserted; that the Supreme Court of Indiana has declared unconstitutional the Indiana General Assembly's attempt to legislatively prohibit the possession of any lawfully acquired property (see Beebe v. State of Indiana, 6 Ind 501 (1855)); that under Indiana and U.S. republican law, individuals – and not government – have primary, subject matter jurisdiction over personal property possession, which is a natural right; that drug users are not required by positive law to register with the Indiana Board of Pharmacy (see IC 35-48-3-3(e)) or with the Drug Enforcement Administration (see 21 USC 822(c); that individuals may be enslaved only for the commission of crime (see the 13th Amendment and Article I, Section 37 of the Indiana constitution (1851)); that all crimes within the law jurisdiction of Indiana are malum in se as defined by law to include a victim (see Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana constitution (1851) and State ex rel Johnson v. White Circuit Court, 77 N.E. 298 (Ind. 1948)); and that this natural right to be free from arrest and prosecution for possession of drugs applies to all quantities of drugs, even large quantities of drugs intended for resale.

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• that drug dealing is lawful, and is not subject to the criminal law jurisdiction, because the law jurisdiction of U.S. Article III courts and of Indiana judicial courts, which possesses the only criminal authority in Indiana, has original, subject matter jurisdiction only over cases or controversies (see Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. constitution, Article I, Sections 5, 19 and 20 of the Indiana constitution (1851), I.C. 33-28-1-2 and I.C. 33-29-1-1.5), which include injury to one's person, property or reputation (see Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana constitution (1851)); that U.S. Article III courts and Indiana judicial courts have subject matter jurisdiction only over injury, which excludes jurisdiction over the non-injurious exercise of natural rights within Indiana, such as drug possession, and over non-injurious commercial enterprise within Indiana, such as drug dealing, the latter which is instead subject to non-criminal regulation under equity;

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• that drug dealers who do not commit malum in se are not subject to the original criminal jurisdiction of judicial courts, but instead are subject only to the administrative law courts of the Indiana Board of Pharmacy or of the Drug Enforcement Administration; and that a constitutional amendment is required to change the subject matter jurisdiction of Article III courts and Indiana judicial courts in order to criminalize the exercise of any natural right or of any legal right to operate commercially within Indiana (see the Case or Controversy Requirement at Article III, Section 2 and the 13th, 18th and 21st Amendments to the U.S. Constitution);

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• that because criminal jurisdiction is largely territorial, then the state of Indiana has subject matter jurisdiction over most crimes that occur within the boundaries of the state; that U.S. crimes which operate within Indiana relate solely to Congress' enumerated powers at Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. constitution; that these include a) crimes related to federal enumerated powers such as over piracy, crimes on the high seas, counterfeiting, offenses against the laws of nations, and violations of the Postal Privilege (under authority of Article I, Section 8, Clauses 6, 7, 10 and 15, for example), and b) crimes proscribed by Congress for the federal areas within Indiana, if any, under authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17; that drug dealing which does not involve the Postal Privilege is not such an enumerated U.S. crime which is described in clause a) directly above, and is not subject to Article III judicial courts; that crimes legislated by Congress for the federal areas within Indiana are not applicable in Indiana outside of these federal areas; that outside of all federal areas within Indiana, if any, both the Indiana legislature and Congress regulate drug commerce, providing equal protection and administrative due process to all manufacturers, distributors and dispensers of drugs (see the Interstate Commerce Clause at Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 and the 14th Amendment); that the police power which is applicable to this business activity within Indiana is regulatory, and is not prohibitory (see Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934)); and that this administrative regulation is to be carried out in Indiana by the Indiana Board of Pharmacy and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and not by judicial courts.

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• that the Indiana Board of Pharmacy and the Drug Enforcement Administration have primary jurisdiction over the manufacture, distribution and dispensing (commerce) of drugs in Indiana (see IC 35-48-2-1(a), IC 35-48-3-3 and 21 USC 822); that neither the Indiana Board of Pharmacy nor the Drug Enforcement Administration has jurisdiction over mere drug possession in Indiana (see IC 35-48-3-3(e), IC 35-48-1-27, 21 USC 822(c), 21 USC 802(27) and 21 USC 844(a)); that within Indiana, the role of these agencies is to regulate such drug commerce within Indiana (see the Interstate Commerce Clause at Article I, Section 8, Clause 3); that such regulation is carried out in the non-criminal equity jurisdiction of Indiana and U.S. administrative law courts, whose equitable remedies must first be exhausted before judicial authority may be invoked (see LHT Capital, LLC v. Indiana Horse Racing Comm'n, 891 N.E.2d 646 (Ind.App. 2008)); that such regulation includes the non-criminal equitable powers to administratively confiscate commercial property and to enjoin disfavored commercial activity (malum prohibita); that because of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, neither U.S. Article III courts nor Indiana judicial courts have original, subject matter jurisdiction over drug possession, drug dealing or other commercial malum prohibita in Indiana (see Article III of the Indiana constitution (1851)); that malum prohibita operates only under regulation in equity, does not operate at law, such as criminal law, and is not applicable to individuals in the law jurisdiction where crime is malum in se; that malum prohibita against unwanted drug dealing is enforced primarily by the non-criminal administrative law courts of the Indiana Board of Pharmacy and the Drug Enforcement Administration, and is not within the original, subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. or state judicial courts; that Indiana judicial courts and Article III courts have appellate (including enforcement) jurisdiction over malum prohibita made respectively by administrative law courts of the Indiana Board of Pharmacy and of the Drug Enforcement Administration, in conformity with the U.S. and Indiana administrative procedures acts, for example at IC 4-21.5-5; that these administrative agencies have neglected their primary powers and duties to regulate all drug commerce within Indiana; and that these agencies have thereby unlawfully allowed or willfully conspired with prosecutors to falsely use judicial courts to enforce their malum prohibita;

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• that all persons or enterprises that are engaged in drug commerce in Indiana (read: all drug dealers) are required to register with (and be approved by) the Indiana Board of Pharmacy and the Drug Enforcement Administration in order to carry-on their drug businesses (see IC 35-48-3-3(a) and (b) and 21 USC 822(a)); that this requirement to register is a legislative admission that drug dealing is subject to administrative regulation under equity and is not subject to the (criminal) law jurisdiction of judicial courts; that “offenses relating to registration” (see IC 35-31.5-2-217 and IC 35-48-4-14(a)) are regulatory violations, and are not criminal offenses, as crime and offense are referred to in the U.S. and Indiana constitutions, and as constitutions determine the criminal jurisdiction of judicial courts, based on injury; that what the Officials hereto have been calling drug “crimes” are instead non-criminal regulatory violations which are primarily subject to administrative law courts instead of to judicial courts; and that the Officials hereto have not recognized or fulfilled the separations of power between law and equity and between the police powers of prohibition and regulation, as they are are required;

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• that all persons engaged in drug commerce (read: all drug dealers) have a 14th Amendment right to due process and equal protection; that the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment requires that all persons who manufacture, distribute or dispense drugs – whether they be pharmaceutical companies or corner drug dealers – be treated the same; that all such artificial persons / commercial enterprises are to be regulated in the non-criminal equity jurisdiction of the executive branch, subject only to legislated equitable remedies such as forfeiture and injunction; that the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment requires the use of the constitutional meaning of crime to prosecute any individual (natural person) in the law jurisdiction for a crime; that the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment also requires that all commercial drug enterprises (as artificial persons) are owed administrative due process respectively by the Indiana Board of Pharmacy and the Drug Enforcement Administration who regulate all drug commerce using their executive branch powers; that this administrative due process is respectively defined by the Indiana Controlled Substances Act which (for example at IC 35-48-3-6) incorporates by reference the Indiana Orders and Procedures Act at IC 4-21.5, and by the U.S. Controlled Substances Act which (at 21 USC 824(c)) incorporates by reference the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act at 5 USC, Chapter 5; and that this regulatory jurisdiction precludes judicial criminal jurisdiction over the same commercial subject matter, i.e., drug dealing, due to the Separation of Powers Doctrine.

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• that the Indiana Board of Pharmacy and the Drug Enforcement Administration within Indiana have authority to administratively enjoin unwanted drug businesses (see IC 16-42-20-3 and 21 USC 882) and to confiscate the commercial property of unwanted drug-dealing operations (see IC 16-42-20-1 and 21 USC 878), but that these agencies and their enforcement officers have no power to incarcerate individuals merely for being in the business or commerce of drugs (see the 18th and 21st Amendments, Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855) and Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934));

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• that Indiana prosecutors and U.S. Attorneys each have authority to move their respective judicial courts for drug contraband to be forfeited (see IC 34-24-1-3(a) and 21 USC 881), and that the Indiana and U.S. Attorneys General each have authority to move their respective courts to enjoin unwanted drug dealing (see IC 35-48-3-3(i) and 21 USC 882), but that none of the above offices have power to criminally prosecute individuals in Indiana merely for being in the business or commerce of drugs (see the 18th and 21st Amendments, Beebe v. State, 6 Ind 501 (1855) and Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934));

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• that because of the Supremacy Clause at Article VI of the U.S. constitution and at Article I, Section 25 of the Indiana constitution (1851), that because IC 1-1-2-1 says that the Indiana legislature must legislate consistently with the Indiana and U.S. constitutions, and that because IC 33-28-1-5(2) says that Indiana courts must rule consistently with said constitutions, then the words “case,” “criminal case,” “crime,” “offense,” “felony,” “misdemeanor,“ “lawful,” “prohibit” and “regulate,” as used in the Indiana Code, must match the meaning of the same words case, criminal case, crime, offense, felony, misdemeanor, law, prohibit and regulate, as used in the Indiana and / or U.S. constitutions, which constitutions share the same meanings;

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• that because of the Supremacy Clause at Article VI of the U.S. constitution and at Article I, Section 25 of the Indiana constitution (1851), then the absence of the words “prohibit” or “unlawful” in the Indiana Controlled Substances Act at IC 35-48-4 indicates that neither drug possession nor drug dealing is unlawful or criminally prohibited in the criminal law jurisdiction of Indiana's judicial courts; that the Indiana legislature has no authority to criminally prohibit or make unlawful anything that is not malum in se; that just calling drug possession, dealing and regulatory violations “misdemeanors” or “felonies” at IC 35-48-4 et seq. does not make them misdemeanors or felonies, cognizable under the U.S. or Indiana constitutions, and is in fact legislative fraud (the willful misrepresentation of law) which was intended to defraud and sucker all of the Officials hereto into falsely performing their lawful and legal duties;

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• that because U.S. criminal jurisdiction is largely territorial (e.g., over the federal areas defined at 8 USC 7, including those federal areas within Indiana), that because Congress otherwise has criminal jurisdiction within the states only over a handful of crimes related to its enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 6, 7, 10 and 15, for example, of the U.S. constitution (see Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077 (2014)), that because Congress regulates all commerce within and among the states under its Interstate Commerce power at Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, and that because Congress is required to guarantee a republican form of government only to the states (see Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. constitution), then Congress' non-republican criminal prohibitions of unwanted drug commerce at 21 USC 841 et seq. 1) apply only within the federal areas which operate under Congress' plenary authority at Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 and 2) may be enforced exclusively in Article I courts where the Case or Controversy Requirement of Article III, Section 2 does not apply (see Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973)); that, at most, only plenary Article I courts in the federal areas have criminal jurisdiction over non-injury and non-injurious commercial practices, and which occur within the federal areas, as proscribed by Congress; and thus that most U.S. prosecutions for drug crimes in Indiana amount to falsely applying statutes in Article III courts that are applicable only in Article I courts of the federal areas, to commit fraud upon Article III courts, to falsely enslave non-criminals in Indiana in violation of Article I, Section 37 of the Indiana constitution (1851), of the 13th Amendment, and of the Guaranty Clause at Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. constitution; and to injure individuals under false color of law, outside of the Officials' delegated immunities;

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• that because Congress need not guarantee a republican form of government to people within the federal areas (and may enforce malum prohibita there as crime, irrespective of injury), and that because one's rights in the federal areas are only those that Congress makes applicable (see Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), 1) then one does not have a judicially secured lawful natural right to privately possess drugs in the federal areas as one does in Indiana, yet 2) Congress bestows the privilege of legal drug possession in the federal areas at 21 USC 844(a), via an affirmative “ultimate user” defense provided at 21 USC 822(c) and 21 USC 802(27); thus, that drug possession is either lawful (in the law jurisdiction of the fifty-one U.S. republics) or drug possession is legal (under the positive laws of Congress in the federal areas) in all places within the United States; and thus that no individuals may be lawfully arrested and prosecuted for drug possession within any portion of Indiana, including in any federal areas within Indiana, including on boats and aircraft registered to the United States;

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• that because the People by means of the Indiana and U.S. constitutions respectively created the subject matter jurisdiction of the Indiana and Article III courts, then neither the state legislature nor Congress may change or enlarge the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. or state judicial courts by redefining the meaning of case, criminal case, crime, offense, felony, misdemeanor, prohibit or regulate without a constitutional amendment; and that, in any regard, a constitutional amendment is required to change the subject matter jurisdiction of any judicial court in order to criminalize any business within Indiana (see the 13th, 18th and 21st Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Beebe v. State, 6 Ind 501 (1855));

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• that because crime is secured by the U.S. and Indiana constitutions to mean malum in se, then enslaving people for non-criminal malum prohibita, which are regulatory violations -- in violation of the 13th Amendment to the U.S. constitution and of Article I, Section 37 of the Indiana constitution (1851) -- amount to false arrest and slavery, which are malum in se torts or crimes in Indiana, to civil rights violations that are perpetrated under false color of law (see, for example, 42 USC 1983), and to the criminal deprivation of rights under false color of law (see, for example, 18 USC 241 and 242); and

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• that the Indiana and U.S. Controlled Substances Acts are arguably constitutional because they secure individuals' natural law right to possess controlled substances and because they provide due process and equal protection to all drug dealers; that the power of law enforcers to arrest individuals and to prosecute them for crime is based solely on the judicial branch's subject matter jurisdiction over crime, as crime is referred to in the U.S. and Indiana constitutions; that because Indiana law enforcers have no authority to arrest non-criminals, such as violators of administrative law, then such power granted to Indiana law enforcers by the Indiana legislature at IC 16-42-20-1(b)(3) and IC 35-31.5-2-217 (read together) is unconstitutional; and that Indiana and U.S. law enforcers may arrest and prosecute only perpetrators of crime within Indiana, as referred to in the U.S. and Indiana constitutions, and not 1) mere exercisers of natural rights or 2) mere regulatory violators, as referred to at IC 35-31.5-2-217.

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Therefore within Indiana, where the state government has jurisdiction over all crimes except those U.S. crimes mentioned above, then all state arrests, prosecutions, convictions and incarcerations for drug possession and drug dealing:

1) violate individuals' constitutionally-enumerated natural unalienable right of drug possession (see Article I, Section 1 of the Indiana constitution (1816)), which natural right applies to all quantities of drugs;
2) violate the legislatively-codified natural right to “lawfully possess” drugs (see IC 35-48-3-3(e) and 21 USC 822(c)), which is the same right as in no. 1 above;
3) violate the 5th Amendment right of due process of law for drug possessors who are not subject to the judicial branch for the exercise of this natural right and who are entitled to be arrested and incarcerated only for crime as referred to in the U.S. and Indiana constitutions;
4) violate the 14th Amendment right of due process for unwanted drug dealers whose unwanted drug dealing is subject to administrative due process, and is not subject to criminal law;
5) violate the 14th Amendment right of equal protection for unwanted drug dealers, who are equally protected from the imposition of criminal law as are pharmaceutical company officers;
6) violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine at Article III of the Indiana constitution by adjudicating drug commerce in the wrong branch of government, as well as the wrong judicial jurisdiction;
7) violate the subject matter jurisdiction of Indiana and U.S. judicial courts over injury (see Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana constitution and Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. constitution);
8) violate the meaning of crime, which definition includes an injury to a victim (see Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana constitution (1851)),
9) violate the Supremacy Clause at Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the U.S. constitution, which requires Indiana's three branches to use the Indiana and U.S. constitutions' meanings of criminal case, crime, offense, felony and misdemeanor, which denote malum in se crime;
10) violate the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, which in Indiana voids judicial appellate jurisdiction; and
11) are fraud upon the court which has no judicial jurisdiction over mere property possession or non-injurious commerce within Indiana.
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As well, federal prosecutions of mere drug dealing within Indiana, among other things:

1) violate the subject matter jurisdiction of Article III courts, which is over cases or controversies;
2) violate the territorial scope of Congress' drug prohibitions at 21 USC 841 – 844A, which are criminal malum prohibita that operate only in the federal areas as defined at 8 USC 7;
3) violate the administrative due process that is owed to unwanted interstate drug dealers under the U.S. Controlled Substances Act, the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act and the 14th Amendment;
4) are fraud upon the court because they misrepresent to Article III courts Congress' plenary authority over the federal areas, which is to be enforced only by Article I courts within the federal areas, as applicable to commercial activity within the states, which is instead subject only to regulation.

The Officials to this document are responsible to know the above information. It is res ipsa loquitur that they and their subordinates have neglected the law, violated their oaths, displayed their professional incompetence, and let down the public. As the old maxim reads: Ignorance of the law does not excuse (ignorantia jurs non excusat). Reads another: A multitude of ignorant practitioners destroys a court (multitudo imperitorum perdit curiam). Indeed.

Consequently, the Officials hereto are put on public Notice that they and their subordinates together have been falsely enforcing, defending and misrepresenting U.S. and Indiana drug law in Indiana; that their false practices demonstrate that they heretofore have not comprehended the separation of powers embodied in the Indiana and U.S. constitutions and in Indiana and U.S. drug statutes; and that to communicate with one another so as to continue to falsely enforce, defend and misrepresent the law is to criminally conspire to harm lawful people and to violate Indiana's positive and natural political laws.

A Demand is hereby made for officials of the City of Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana and the U.S. government to begin properly enforcing state and federal drug laws within Indiana as herein described.

This instrument is prepared by Kurt St. Angelo.

Interested parties may soon listen online to a 6-part audio presentation about this Notice and Demand. A transcript of this audio presentation is presently available to read, beginning at http://http://www.drugsarelegal.com/transcript1.html

I affirm under penalty for perjury that I have taken reasonable care to dedact each Social Security number in this document, unless required by law.

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X________________________________
Date:  Recorded on March 15, 2018; Mailed on March 17, 2018
Kurt St. Angelo
Indianapolis, Indiana
kurtsaintangelo@gmail.com