Summary of America's drug laws (using Indiana law as an example)
Using the law of Indiana as an example, the following is a summary of America's republican drug laws.
that drug possession is lawful in America's republics because people have a natural unalienable right of acquiring, possessing and defending property (see Article I, Section 1 of the Indiana constitution (1816)), as well as a natural unalienable right of intoxication (see the 9th Amendment to the U.S. constitution);
that drug possession is legal because drug users are not required to register with the Indiana State Board of Pharmacy (see IC 35-48-3-3(a)) or with the U.S. Attorney General (see 21 USC 822(a)), and they have a statutory, legal right to “lawfully possess” drugs for their own use and that of the households (see IC 35-46-3-3(e)(3) and 21 USC 822(c));
that drug possession and dealing are lawful because the law jurisdiction of Indiana's judicial courts, which is the only criminal jurisdiction in Indiana, has authority only over injury to one's person, property or reputation (see Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana constitution (1851));
that crime is defined by natural law to include a victim (see Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana constitution (1851))
that drug dealers have a statutory legal right to administrative due process regarding their manufacture, distribution and dispensing of drugs (see IC 4-21.5-3 and IC 35-48-3)
that Indiana's drug enforcers have authority to shut down and confiscate the fruits of unwanted drug-dealing operations (see IC 16-42-20-1), but no power to incarcerate people merely for being in the business or commerce of drugs (see the 18th and 21st Amendments and Beebe v. State of Indiana (1855),
that Indiana prosecutors have authority to move for drug contraband to be judicially forfeited (see IC 34-24-1-3(a)) and the state Attorney General has authority to move to enjoin unwanted drug dealing (see IC 35-48-3-3(i)), but neither office has power to criminally prosecute people merely for being in the business of drugs (see the 18th and 21st Amendments and Beebe v. State (1855)).
that because of the Supremacy Clause at Article VI of the U.S. constitution and at Article I, Section 25 of the Indiana constitution (1851), that because IC 1-1-2-1 says that the Indiana legislature must legislate consistently with the Indiana and U.S. constitutions, and that because IC 33-28-1-5(2) says that Indiana courts must rule consistently with the constitutions, the words “case,” “criminal case,” “crime,” “offense,” “felony” and “misdemeanor” as used in the Indiana Code, must match the meaning of the same words case, criminal case, crime, offense, felony and misdemeanor as used in the Indiana and / or U.S. constitutions.
that because the Indiana constitution created the subject matter jurisdiction of the Indiana judicial courts, then the state legislature may not change or enlarge the subject matter jurisdiction of state judicial courts, by redefining the meaning of case, criminal case, crime, offense, felony and misdemeanor, without a constitutional amendment,
that, in any regard, a constitutional amendment is required to change the subject matter jurisdiction of the state's republican judicial courts in order to criminalize any business within Indiana (see the 13th, 18th and 21st Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Beebe v. State (1855); and
that enslaving people for non-criminal behavior – as crime is defined by the 13th Amendment to the U.S. constitution and at Article I, Section 37 of the Indiana constitution (1851) – amounts to illegal slavery.
Federal drug laws can be summarized as follows:
that the United States' criminal jurisdiction is largely territorial, that Congress has criminal jurisdiction within the states only over a handful of crimes relating to its enumerated powers in the U.S. constitution, and that Congress criminally prohibits drug dealing only within the federal areas;
that Article III courts have subject matter jurisdiction only over injury, which excludes jurisdiction over the exercise of natural rights within America's republics, such as drug possession, and over the criminalization of non-injurious business practices within the republics, such as drug dealing, which are subject to non-criminal regulation under equity (see the interstate commerce clause at Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. constitution);
that a constitutional amendment is required to change the subject matter jurisdiction of Article III courts in order to criminalize any business within the state republics (see the 13th, 18th and 21st Amendments to the U.S. Constitution);
that, at most, only plenary Article I courts have subject matter jurisdiction over non-injury and non-injurious business practices, such as drug dealing, and which occur within the federal areas, as proscribed by Congress at 21 USC 841-844A under its authority of "Exclusive legislation" at Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S constitution;
that drug dealing is not a crime relating to federal enumerated powers under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. constitution, but is instead a business activity subject to regulation under Congress' interstate commerce clause (see Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution); and
that the U.S. republic is to treat all interstate commerce (except for the commerce in slaves, which is a state crime) as regulated – non-criminal – activity, subject to the non-criminal equity jurisdiction of its republican administrative law courts, whose remedies must first be exhausted before judicial authority is invoked.
These facts lead to the inevitable conclusions that drug possession is a natural right, that drug dealing is a regulated activity, and that to lawfully treat either a natural right or a business as a crime within an American republic requires an amendment to its republican constitution, just as the 18th Amendment was required to criminalize the commerce of alcohol.