Audio Presentation Part 4:
More on the separations of power
The next relevant separation of power within the United States that we will discuss is that between the powers of the states, such as Indiana, and the powers of Congress legislating in or with regard to the states. As we have already discovered, both Indiana and the U.S. government – as republics – have two police powers within Indiana: regulation that operates under equity and natural civil and criminal prohibition that works at law.
For example, both Indiana and the U.S. government regulate commerce and foreigners. Indiana's power to regulate is inherent as a sovereign. Congress's powers to regulate commerce and foreigners within Indiana come from Article I, Section 8, Clauses 3 and 4 of the U.S. constitution. Because of the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. constitution, Congress exercises supreme power over states' regulation of commerce and foreigners.
With regard to drugs, one's authority to be in drug commerce within Indiana requires permission of regulators in the Indiana pharmacy board and the D.E.A. Ultimately, using the executive branch's equitable powers, these agencies' administrative law courts may enjoin unwanted drug businesses. Likewise the administrative law courts of the Immigration and Naturalization Service may exert their equitable power of specific performance by ordering unwanted foreigners out of the country.
While both of these equitable remedies against unwanted drug dealing and unwanted foreigners are primarily administrative – that is, they are exercised non-criminally within the executive branch – once these powers are exhausted administratively, then they may ultimately be enforced judicially, using judicial courts' contempt powers.
So for example, the Indiana pharmacy board may administratively enjoin a drug dealer from making or selling drugs without the board's permission. If this administrative injunction is violated, its violation may be brought to a judicial court and be supported by a judicial injunction, which can be enforced by judicial contempt authority.
In a nutshell, this is how regulation works. The legal rights of artificial entities, such as businesses and foreigners, are adjudicated in administrative law courts in the executive branch, and are ultimately enforced or appealed in the judicial branch. Thus, judicial courts serve to enforce or appeal administrative court decisions.
Now let's look at criminal law. Unlike regulation, criminal law is largely territorial, is solely adjudicated in the judicial branch, and operates only upon natural flesh-and-blood persons, who can be physically incarcerated. Criminal jurisdiction is usually based on where the crime occurs.
Thus, state governments generally have sole jurisdiction over most crimes that occur within their boundaries. I say “generally” because there are three exceptions to this principle of exclusive state criminal jurisdiction. These three exceptions are where the U.S. government has primary criminal jurisdiction over certain crimes or over certain areas within the states' borders.
The first of three exceptions is Congress' criminal powers within the states over mostly national crimes. This criminal power is enumerated in the U.S. constitution to include the counterfeiting of currency, piracy, felonies on the high seas, and offenses against the laws of nations. This latter category includes “offenses against the United States” such as blowing up federal buildings or violating the postal privilege. So, for example, the U.S. government has exclusive criminal jurisdiction over all the counterfeiting of currency in Indiana and over the use of the postal privilege to send unwanted drugs and other contraband (see License Cases. 46 U.S. 600 (1847))
The second exception to exclusive state criminal jurisdiction is where the U.S. constitution is changed so as to grant mutual concurrent criminal jurisdiction over certain matters, as was the case with alcohol commerce under the 18th Amendment. During Alcohol Prohibition, both the U.S. government and state governments shared concurrent criminal law jurisdiction over alcohol commerce, with U.S. power being supreme. When Prohibition ended, these governments went back to having concurrent regulatory jurisdiction over alcohol commerce, which they share today.
The third exception to exclusive state criminal jurisdiction are the crimes that occur within the federal areas and within federal enclaves within the states, where state criminal power has been displaced. Such federal enclaves within the states are where the U.S. government both owns the land and where the state has legislatively ceded criminal jurisdiction over the land.
In general, in these federal areas, U.S. criminal law and / or the military code is enforced there – and not the criminal code of states. Because of the territoriality of criminal jurisdiction, this occurs solely if the U.S. government – and not the state itself – is sovereign over the land, either by grant or constitutional reservation.
The U.S. Criminal Code, essentially Title 18 of the U.S. Code, operates in the federal areas, including in these federal enclaves within the states. Thus, a crime committed within the federal areas is not subject to state criminal law, but would instead be investigated by a federal agency and tried in a U.S. court as a U.S. crime.
These federal areas are defined at 8 USC 7. They include not only the District of Columbia and federal enclaves within the states (mentioned above), but also all U.S. territories (such as Guam, Puerto Rico, Marianas Islands, American Samoa and the Virgin Islands), all coastal and navigable waterways of the U.S., and all ships, spaceships and airplanes registered to the United States.
Thus, when we enter the District of Columbia, or when we vacation in Puerto Rico, or when we enter a ship or an airplane in the U.S., then we are leaving the republican form of government that Congress guarantees to us within the states and we are entering and consenting to a non-republican, dictatorial form of government that Congress administers in the federal areas.
What my two aforementioned law books uniquely show and explain is that Congress owes a republican form of government to America's fifty republican states and to the people within these states, but that Congress does not owe a republican government to visitors or inhabitants of the federal areas, including on ships and airplanes.
There, in the federal areas, Congress legislates as does a non-republic, such as a dictatorship or oligarchy, albeit a fairly benevolent one. Thus to understand American law and government is to understand the differences between the republican and non-republican forms of government, and where these forms operate within the territorial area called the United States.
It is logical that the Founding Fathers wanted a national authority with a criminal border jurisdiction to prevent unwanted contraband, enemy governments and disruptive foreigners from entering the nation. So, having a non-republican or dictatorial government within the United States to be in charge of this border is not necessarily bad if we can keep its powers separate from the republican form of government that is owed to us within the states, which unfortunately our attorneys have not.
But my real point is this: that Congress has two legislative capacities. First, according to Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. constitution, Congress must guarantee the republican form of government to the states, which are themselves republics. In this regard, Congress legislates as would a republic toward the state republics, within which it and the states share the same two republican police powers of prohibition of crime and regulation of commerce, and use the same natural definitions of crime and commerce.
And in its second capacity, Congress legislates as a dictator with plenary or absolute power over the federal areas, with no inherent separation between its power to regulate (under equity) and its power to incarcerate (which it does mostly under a sub-equity police power called admiralty).
As we learned earlier, within republics, 1) individuals have a natural private right to possess all forms of lawfully acquired property, including drugs, and 2) foreigners and commercial persons, such as drug dealers, are subject to regulation. Due to the Separation of Powers Doctrine within the republican form of government, then both business people and foreigners are primarily subject to regulation under equity, but like everyone else, they are not primarily subject to the judicial branch unless they personally commit natural wrongs.
However, within the federal areas, where Congress need not legislate as a republic, where it need not regulate drug businesses but may criminally prohibit them, and where – according to the U.S. Supreme Court – Congress (and not Nature) chooses which rights are applicable to people there, 1) then Congress need not recognize the natural right of property possession in the federal areas, 2) then Congress need not define crime naturally, as malum in se, there, 3) then Congress may enslave anyone that it wishes in the federal areas (except for the President and Vice President, who are the only natural born citizens with natural rights in the federal areas), and 4) then Congress need not grant the legal right of regulatory due process that is due to all drug dealers within the fifty states, under the 14th Amendment.
Instead, within the federal areas (including on all navigable and coastal waterways within the U.S.), where all rights come from Congress instead of Nature, then Congress may criminally prohibit both property possession and commercial enterprises. Thus, the federal areas are the only places within the United States that Congress may (or that any American legislature may) criminally prohibit property – both the possession of property and the commerce in property. Again, this is because Congress need not be republican in the federal areas, but may instead legislate in a non-republican or dictatorial capacity there.
Given this, let's first talk about the legal status of drug possession within the federal areas. Although there is no natural right to possess drugs there, because these federal areas are not republics, Congress nonetheless grants the legal right to its subjects to possess all drugs there. This can be discerned by carefully reading in conjunction 21 USC 844(a), 21 USC 822(c) and 21 USC 802(27).
That drug possession is legal in the federal areas means that Congress says that no one is to go to jail for drug possession there. This means that people may legally possess their allergy medicine, their cancer medicine or their favorite head medicine, as a matter of legal right, or as a bestowed privilege of Congress.
This compares to the rights of inhabitants in Indiana and other states who may lawfully possess these same drugs as a matter of natural right. Again, drug possession in the federal areas is a bestowed legal right, whereas drug possession in Indiana is a natural law right, the latter which is secured by the Case or Controversy Requirement of judicial courts.
Within the federal areas, everything operates under the sole authority of Congress. Nature and her law jurisdiction have no power over Congress there. Congress exercises its plenary authority using its powers of equity and admiralty, the latter which is the law of a captain on a sea. In other words, within the federal areas, everyone is an artificial subject of Congress and all of government operates solely under the positive law authority of Congress – that is, under either equity or admiralty, with no natural limitations upon Congress' positive law authority.
In effect, there is no law jurisdiction in the federal areas, where natural rights can be secured, because natural law is not recognized in non-republics. Only the legislative jurisdiction of Man is recognized in non-republics. Thus Man, i.e., Congress, defines what is criminally right and wrong in the federal areas, not Nature. As well, Congress defines people's political rights in the federal areas, not natural law.
This means that people in the federal areas are subjects of Congress. If you enter the District of Columbia or an airplane or a ship, for example, then you consent to become a subject of Congress. The only exceptions to this are the President and Vice President. They are the only natural born citizens of the states who carry their natural political rights with them in the federal areas, and who are not subjects of Congress. Otherwise Congress could criminalize their non-criminal behavior, as Congress can do for everyone else.
In terms of drugs, this means that the President and Vice President are the only persons in Washington, D.C. with the natural right to possess drugs. This is because they exercise all of their natural rights in the federal areas as if they were within a state. This is so they are not subject to arrest by Congress, which is a dictator over the federal areas. The President and the Vice President must be natural born citizens so that they are not already subjects of Congress, as are citizens of the United States.
This belies one of the reasons why adopted, naturalized citizens of the United States are prohibited by the U.S. constitution from being President. As artificial citizens, all of their political rights are granted by Congress. Such persons are by definition subjects of Congress. Presidents who are subjects of Congress would violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine.
The Separation of Powers Doctrine requires the executive branch to be independent of the legislative branch. Natural born citizens are the only U.S. citizens who are free and independent of Congress. In contrast, naturalized citizens of the United States are subjects of Congress. Thus, to install a naturalized citizen of the United States as President would be to subject the presidency to the authority of Congress, thereby violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine.
So, in the federal areas, other than with the President and Vice President, then drug possession is a legal right as a right bestowed by Congress upon its subjects. In contrast, drug possession is a lawful natural right within a republic, which right is bestowed by Nature and secured by the Case or Controversy Requirement of state and federal constitutions. As we shall see, the U.S. and state Controlled Substances Acts codify individuals' natural right to privately possess drugs within all fifty states.
This all means 1) that drug possession is legal within the federal areas, but not lawful, because there is no law jurisdiction there (except for the President and the Vice President), and 2) that drug possession is lawful within the states but not literally legal because property possession is not a legislatively-granted right or privilege.
So, to be succinct and yet accurate, we can say that: drug possession is legal in the federal areas, where Congress determines what is right and wrong, or criminal, while drug possession is lawful within the fifty states, where natural law determines what is right and wrong, or criminal. And this is true for everyone but the President and Vice President, who as natural born citizens carry their natural political rights with them wherever they are within the territorial U.S.
In that you now understand how state and U.S. law deals with drug possession, i.e., that it is a natural lawful right in Indiana and a bestowed legal right in the federal areas, now we will discuss drug dealing in the federal areas. To deal drugs is to manufacture, distribute or dispense them.
Drug dealing encompasses every kind of business or artificial person making money off of drugs, including licensed doctors, nurses, pharmaceutical companies, freight companies, delivery people, pharmacists, international drug traffickers and unwanted local drug merchants. All of these desirable and undesirable professionals are drug dealers because they all make their livings from somehow making, distributing or dispensing drugs.
By now, we know that within America's fifty state republics, all commerce (except slavery) is regulated. As well, the 14th Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses tell us that governments within the states are to treat all artificial persons within the same commercial class the same.
In the case of drugs, all governments within the fifty states are to treat all drug dealers – that is, all who manufacture, distribute or dispense drugs – the same. But this rule of equal protection applies only within the state republics where the republican form of government is guaranteed.
In contrast, within the federal areas 1) where Congress is the sole sovereign with plenary or absolute power, 2) where Nature and her political laws are not recognized, 3) where there is no separation of power between law and equity because there is no law jurisdiction, and 4) where all government powers are positive law powers that serve Congress as the sole political sovereign, instead of recognizing two sovereigns, then Congress has the absolute authority to deal with drug dealers any way that it wishes there, pretty much like a dictator.
And so it does.
And what Congress does is this: It regulates the favored kind of drug dealing in the federal areas – that by pharmaceutical companies, drug stores, doctors, nurses, hospitals and pharmacists, who are all directly or indirectly licensed by the D.E.A. – and Congress criminally prohibits all drug dealing within the federal areas that is not licensed by the D.E.A., including that by international drug traffickers and corner drug dealers. Whereas the D.E.A. regulates disfavored drug merchants within the state republics, the D.E.A. and other agencies (such as the Coast Guard) are empowered to criminally prohibit unwanted drug commerce within the federal areas, where Congress need not act republican.
In other words, within the fifty states, D.E.A. agents have regulatory jurisdiction over all drug commerce, just like state drug regulators do. Only in the federal areas, such as along U.S. coastlines or borders, or in U.S. boats and aircraft, are these D.E.A. regulators transformed into criminal law enforcers because Congress may criminally prohibits drug commerce in these places. Thus, the location of malum prohibita defines which of Congress' two police powers is operative.
Criminal prohibition in the federal areas is administered – not by judicial courts created under Article III of the U.S. constitution, which are subject to the Case or Controversy Requirement at Article III, Section 2 – but instead by courts created by Congress under Article I. Because these Article I courts administer the non-republican form of government within the federal areas, then Congress – and not the Case or Controversy Requirement of the U.S. constitution – may determine these courts' jurisdiction.
Because the Case or Controversy Requirement does not apply within Article I courts, and thus, because injury-in-fact is not required for their subject matter jurisdiction, then disfavored drug dealers may be enslaved by these legislative courts without their violating anyone's natural rights.
Because the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment do not apply within the federal areas, then disfavored drug dealers need not be regulated and need not be given the same administrative due process that favored ones get there.
And because the 13th Amendment does not apply within the federal areas, then all visitors and inhabitants of the federal areas may be Congress' subject-slaves. Their rights are only those rights that Congress as the political sovereign has made applicable, just like a king or a slave master.
However in a republic, such as Indiana, Nature and not the Indiana legislature determines people's political rights. These political rights are the natural unalienable and inherent rights to life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness, which is just a catchphrase for all our many, many other natural unwritten political rights that are secured by the 9th Amendment. I list most of these natural political rights on pages 46 through 50 of my first book BUSTED.
One of these rights is to have natural political equality with everyone else, for example, an equal right to liberty. In context of our discussion about drugs, despicable corner drug dealers are to have an equal right to liberty as respected drug dealers who wear white lab coats and who are approved by drug regulators. Both the good kind and the bad kind of drug dealers have an equal right to liberty, which is to be judged by the same standard of intentional harm.
Both of these drugs dealers have the same substantive right to be jailed only for crime, not for their commercial enterprises. Thus, while they do not have the same equal legal right to make and sell drugs, which is a bestowed right from a legislature's agency, they nonetheless all have 1) an equal right under the 14th Amendment to the same administrative process to determine such legal right, as well as 2) an equal substantive right under the Bill of Rights to not be incarcerated for being in a disfavored business, which is an equal substantive right to keep government's rightful jurisdictions over commerce and crime separate.
So, within America's 51 republics, all drug dealers are to be treated the same, both under law (or natural law) as a natural right in the criminal law jurisdiction and under equity according to the 14th Amendment. Consequently, neither the good kind nor the bad kind of drug dealers are per se criminal, neither are subject to the criminal law jurisdiction unless they injure others, and both are to be accorded equal administrative due process under equity to define their legal rights to engage the public in drug commerce.
Just as republican legislatures may not grant anyone the right to defy gravity (a natural physical law), then they may not grant anyone the right to violate this equal right to liberty (a natural political law). This is because republican legislatures are not in charge of defining right and wrong, and the criminal grounds for depriving us of our liberty. Nature is. Nature defines the grounds for our incarceration, which starts with our violating the natural rights of others.
Logically, drug dealing may not be criminal because neither the Indiana legislature nor Congress, and neither the pharmacy board nor the D.E.A., may authorize anyone to commit crimes. That the president and board members of the Eli Lilly are not in jail is evidence that making and selling drugs is not criminal.
Instead, both the Indiana pharmacy board and the D.E.A., which have primary jurisdiction over all drug commerce within the state, have granted the drug maker the license to make and sell drugs, which license is the privilege to be in drug commerce, not the privilege to commit crimes, which neither agency has power to grant.
So, authority given to pharmaceutical companies to make and sell drugs is permission to be in drug commerce, not permission to commit crime. This means, conversely, that people in drug commerce without governments' permission are not criminals, but are instead regulatory violators. They are violators of the government's commercial jurisdiction, not its criminal jurisdiction. This is why the D.E.A. regulates interstate drug commerce and why both it and the F.B.I. lack criminal jurisdiction over drug commerce within the states.
In conclusion, commerce and crime are two separate constitutional words, and two separate constitutional concepts, that are to be dealt with in separate judicial jurisdictions under separate sovereigns, against different kinds of persons, and using separate police powers. Nature and her natural political laws are sovereign over the criminal law jurisdiction of republics. Republican legislatures are sovereign over who may engage the public in commerce. It's pretty much that simple.
To practice law properly, one must know the difference between crime and commerce within America's state republics. However, you would not need to know this distinction in the federal areas where Congress – with absolute, plenary power – may artificially equate these two natural terms.
As we have learned, 1) within the states, no one in mere commerce is a criminal except human slavers and traffickers, and 2) drug commerce is criminal only in the federal areas. Within the fifty states, commerce is regulated, and subject to equity – not to criminal law. Thus, to confuse the constitutional terms crime and commerce – as has occurred for at least the past fifty years in American criminal law – is to not be qualified to practice or adjudicate criminal law within the United States.
To recap, we can now see the distinction between republics, such as Indiana, and non-republics, such as Congress in the federal areas. Republics are based on Man's positive law as held in check by the political laws of Nature. Republics maintain a law (or natural law) jurisdiction to secure individuals' natural rights from positive law. In contrast, non-republics and all advocates of non-republican government deny the role of natural law so as to give monopoly power to Man's positive law.
In republics, we have rights granted by Nature and secured by the written law. In non-republics such as in the federal areas, we have rights granted only by the positive law of Congress, who is the sole political sovereign there.
As we have seen, drug possession and drug dealing are lawful in Indiana in the criminal law jurisdiction. This is because neither behavior violates anyone else's natural rights. Thus, no one is supposed to go to jail for possessing or selling property in Indiana.
However, drug dealing may violate positive law, which can make it illegal. Disfavored drug dealing in Indiana can be made illegal as malum prohibita. This means that it can legitimately be stopped using the powers of regulation under equity. However, disfavored drug dealing may not legitimately be stopped using our criminal courts, which have no subject matter jurisdiction over commerce. This would be to enslave non-criminals and to commit slavery in violation of the 13th Amendment.
Because Indiana is a republic, and because Congress legislates as a republic with regard to Indiana, then 1) both the U.S. and state governments define and treat crime the same, as malum in se, and 2) both governments are to deal with this disfavored and illegal malum prohibita in their non-criminal equity jurisdictions, using their equitable powers of forfeiture and injunction.
In contrast, drug possession is legal in the federal areas and disfavored drug dealing is illegal there. (Notice that I did not say unlawful.) Within the federal areas, drug possession is a congressionally-bestowed legal right and unlicensed drug dealing is a congressionally-prohibited legal – but not natural – wrong. Because the law jurisdiction does not operate in non-republics, such as in Article I courts in the federal areas, then crime is not defined naturally there and there are no natural rights to liberty or property that are recognized.
Because the law jurisdiction (and its protections of natural rights) do not operate within the federal areas, then all criminal justice there comes from the positive law of Congress and all of this legislated law is administered in the artificial jurisdictions of equity and admiralty, over which Congress – and not Nature – is sovereign. And because there are no real, inherent separations of power in non-republics, then there is no real distinction between Congress' civil powers under equity and its criminal powers under admiralty within the federal areas.
The long and the short of all this are three points. The first point is that drug possession is lawful within America's fifty state republics and it is legal (that is, a granted right) within the federal areas. Thus, the private right of drug possession is either lawful or legal throughout every inch of the United States, including on land or water and on airplanes and ships registered to the United States. Thus, no one may lawfully or legally be arrested anywhere in the U.S. for private drug possession, and because of this, most arrests and prosecutions in the U.S. have heretofore been false and unlawful.
The second point is that all drug dealing is lawful, or non-criminal, within the fifty state republics. So for instance, no one may be criminally arrested for drug dealing here in Indiana. However, drug dealing is regulated, which means that the legislative and executive branches may make certain kinds of drug dealing illegal – or malum prohibita – using their powers of equity.
This malum prohibita is to be non-criminally enforced, using the equitable remedies of forfeiture and injunction. In other words, the Indiana legislature is not prevented from getting rid of certain disfavored kinds of drug commerce, but that this malum prohibita is to be enforced in non-criminal equity, not under criminal law.
The third point is that disfavored drug dealing is criminally prohibited only in the federal areas where the criminal authority of Congress is not held in check by Nature and its law jurisdiction, or by the Separation of Powers Doctrine, as Congress' powers are held in check within the fifty state republics.
So, if one is busted smuggling drugs in the coastal waterways, then that is a federal crime. Such a federal crime in the federal areas may be adjudicated only in courts made for these federal areas, called Article I courts, where Congress may criminalize malum prohibita. In contrast, drug dealing is not a crime punishable in state judicial courts or in Article III judicial courts within the state republics, which have subject matter jurisdiction only over cases or controversies involving injury, and not over consensual drug dealing, which within all state republics is instead a state or federal regulatory matter.
Ultimately, the word “control” in the Controlled Substances Acts 1) applies only to the commerce of drugs (because the CSAs do not try to control individuals), and 2) depends on where one is. To be “controlled” means to be subject to a police power, which individual drug possession is not.
To be “controlled” means for drug merchants to be regulated within the fifty states and to be subject to criminal prohibition within the federal areas. So, the kind of “control” that is legislated in the U.S. Controlled Substances Act is solely over drug commerce, and how the act treats unwanted drug commerce depends on where this commerce occurs.
Thus, based on the territoriality of criminal jurisdiction that we discussed earlier, then where within the United States that one deals drugs is of paramount legal importance. If one deals drugs within the state republics, such as Indiana, then such dealing is regulated and subject to being enjoined.
If one deals drugs without a license in the federal areas, then such drug dealing is criminally prohibited. Keep in mind as well that drug dealing is subject to legislative Article I courts within the federal areas, but due to the Separation of Powers Doctrine and to the Case or Controversy Requirement of judicial courts, then such unwanted drug commerce is not primarily subject to Article III courts within the states.
What both of my books uniquely demonstrate is that the statutes that criminally prohibit drug dealing within the federal areas are falsely and unlawfully used by the Justice Department and its U.S. Attorneys to criminally sanction drug merchants within the states, who are instead to be regulated. The meaning of 21 USC 822(a), as read in conjunction with the 14th Amendment, is that all drug merchants within the states – that is, all commercial enterprises that manufacture, distribute or dispense drugs within the states – are to be regulated by the U.S. Attorney General and his D.E.A. – not criminally prosecuted.
This principle is equally applicable to gun sales. 18 USC 922 says that unlicensed gun sales are criminal, which prohibition can only apply within the federal areas. In contrast, the very following code provision 18 USC 923 says that unlicensed gun sales are subject to regulation, which applies within the fifty states. To be blind to these distinctions between prohibition and regulation, and between Congress' prohibitory powers over the federal areas and its regulatory powers within the states, is to render one unable and unfit to properly practice federal criminal law, which again is to properly define and divide power.
Thus, according to the statutes and to the Separation of Powers Doctrine, U.S. Article III courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over mere drug, gun and alcohol commerce, for example, which is instead subject to regulation by administrative law courts of the D.E.A. and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Because of this fact, U.S. Attorneys have been misrepresenting at least U.S. drug and gun laws to Article III courts in order for these courts to unlawfully claim criminal jurisdiction over these regulatory violations, which are non-cases.
(Parenthetically, I devote chapter 25 of my first book BUSTED to dissecting and dismissing a dozen randomly selected non-cases and non-crimes that were falsely filed and / or prosecuted in U.S. District Courts by various U.S. District Attorneys. Check it out.)
Given the information that I provide government officials in my Notice and Demand, in my two law books, and in this presentation, then the future false representations of law by the U.S. Department of Justice and by its U.S. Attorneys to Article III courts and their judges constitutes willful fraud upon the courts. The correct representation of law and a proper demurrer by defense attorneys is that unlicensed drug dealing is a crime only in the federal areas because it is a regulatory violation within the states, and regulatory violations are not the subject matter of Article III courts due to the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the Case or Controversy Requirement. One's defense against criminal drug dealing charges cannot be more simple than that.
The various separations of power that we earlier discussed do not exist in non-republics, such as in the federal areas, 1) where all law and government serve Congress as sovereign, 2) where such non-republican sovereign denies the natural rights of individuals, including individual liberty and political equality, and 3) where this political sovereign – instead of Nature – defines everyone political rights.
The above separations of power that we've discussed exist only in republics. These separations serve 1) to secure people's natural rights, 2) to secure artificial persons' artificial legal rights, such as a drug dealer's right to administrative due process within the state republics, and 3) to secure the political laws of Nature, whose existence is inherently denied by all non-republics.
All non-republics – including Congress in the federal areas – must deny the political laws of Nature because these governments oppose natural liberty, political equality and objective scientific justice within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Justice within the federal areas is as Congress – the sole sovereign there – says it is. It is justice untempered by the objective laws of Nature.
So, the logical conclusions of the seven separations of power that we have discussed are 1) that within America's fifty state republics, individuals have natural rights to honestly, nonviolently and consensually acquire and possess personal property, in the form of drugs, from anyone who lawfully possesses such drugs; 2) that people who are engaged in the commerce of drugs, called drug dealers, who either manufacture, distribute or dispense drugs within and among the states, are subject to regulation under the non-criminal equity jurisdiction by a state or U.S. agency in the executive branch, 3) that people who commit drug crimes are to be arrested, prosecuted and incarcerated by state law enforcers and courts, and 4) that only unapproved drug dealers in the federal areas may be criminally prosecuted for drug dealing, and that this to be accomplished in Article I courts in the federal areas, which are essentially the only courts in America with criminal jurisdiction over commercial malum prohibita.
Before looking at drug statutes, which support everything I've said so far and which we will do in the next part of this presentation, I want to make one final substantive point. This point is that: although it is not a crime to manufacture and sell drugs to other consenting adults within America's state republics, such as Indiana, there are nonetheless real drug crimes that are recognized in the Controlled Substances Acts. Real drug crimes are actual crimes that involve drugs, such as stealing them, or counterfeiting them, or cutting or contaminating them, or fraudulently misrepresenting them. All of these acts of deceit, conversion and violence are actual crimes that involve drugs. Thus the term: drug crimes.
In comparison, selling a neighbor a joint or an Oxycontin pill is not a crime. Why? As we have seen, first, this is because such disfavored selling is not unlawful in the law jurisdiction, where Nature defines criminal right and wrong as well as courts' subject matter jurisdiction over injury.
And two: selling or dispensing a joint or a pill is not a crime because it is commercial behavior that is, instead, subject to regulation. Most of our Hoosier neighbors who sell or dispense drugs are not criminals, but are instead honest and nonviolent regulation violators, who have failed to register with and to gain approval from the Indiana pharmacy board and the D.E.A., both who have primary – that is adjudicatory – jurisdiction over all drug commerce.
Instead of being unlawful, and thus criminal, it is only illegal to make and sell drugs without the government's permission in a republic. What is illegal is malum prohibita. Except in the federal areas, everything that is illegal or malum prohibita within the United States is to be enforced under regulation, using governments' equitable powers of forfeiture, injunction, and specific performance – not using the criminal justice system.
So, everything that is unlawful or criminal is malum in se by natural persons and is adjudicated in the law jurisdiction of judicial courts. In contrast, everything that is illegal is malum prohibita and, within America's republics, is enforced against artificial persons by administrative law courts in the executive branch, exercising their equitable regulatory powers. Thus, to criminally enforce malum prohibita in judicial courts of state and federal republics, against natural persons with natural rights, as does the unlawful judicially-waged drug war, is to violate most of the separations of power that we just discussed and the rights of the criminally-accused.
Recall that unapproved corner drug dealers have an equal natural right to liberty as approved drug dealers, which equal right is secured in the law jurisdiction by the Case or Controversy Requirement and by the Bill of Rights. As well, recall that under the 14th Amendment disfavored drug dealers have an equal right to administrative due process, just as favored drug companies receive. This ultimately means that all drug dealers – rich or poor, black brown or white, lab-coated or not – have the same rights under both law and equity, which means that they are both always to be regulated and criminally prohibited using the same criteria.
On that thought, I will conclude part 4 of this presentation. Part 5 begins our discussion of drug statutes.