Audio Presentation Part 5:
How drug statutes secure our natural and legal rights, but why attorneys don't know this
Parts 1 through 4 of this presentation have explained 1) the several separations of power under republican law, 2) the meaning of crime as malum in se, 3) the jurisdiction of judicial courts over injury, 4) the absolute power of Congress over the federal areas, and 5) the distinctions between what in criminal (that is, what is unlawful under law) and what is illegal (that is, what is legislatively prohibited under equity). Now, finally, we are going to take a look at actual drug statutes that demonstrate all of the separations and definitions of power that we have heretofore discussed.
As these separations and definitions pervade American constitutions, they also manifest in statutes. Says IC 1-1-2-1, which is at the very beginning of the Indiana Code, all Indiana statutes must be consistent with the state and U.S. constitutions. This is consistent with the Supremacy Clauses in our constitutions, which say that they – our constitutions, and not our legislatures' statutes – are our paramount law.
So, for example, when statutes refer to cases, controversies, crimes, offenses, felonies and misdemeanors, then these words used in our code books must connote the same meaning as those same words that are used in our republican constitutions. These words connote injurious behavior that fulfills judicial courts' Case or Controversy Requirement, as well as the rules of standing and justiciability.
Otherwise, as we have seen, to enslave people for behaviors that do not amount to crimes, offenses, felonies or misdemeanors, or that do not amount even to judicial cases, which require injury – but to instead enslave people for behavior that amounts at most to regulatory violations, i.e., malum prohibita – is in fact to commit slavery in violation of the 13th Amendment and Article I, Section 37 of the Indiana constitution.
With this background in mind, we now turn to Indiana and U.S. drug statutes.
Heretofore I have asserted that Indiana's drug statutes secure individuals' natural right to possess drugs and disfavored drug businesses' legal right to the same administrative due process that pharmaceutical companies receive. This is plainly evident from reading merely one ignored statute from the Indiana Controlled Substances Act, i.e., Indiana Code 35-48-3-3, and one ignored statute from the U.S. CSA, i.e., 21 USC 822, both which read roughly the same.
I suspect that very few Indiana drug defense attorneys or criminal judges have ever read these essential statutory provisions, which exist in all 45 or 46 Controlled Substances Acts. These statutes singularly explain how drugs are to be treated within an American republic such as Indiana by local, state and U.S. officials.
First, at IC 35-48-3-3 (a) and (b), the Indiana Controlled Substances Acts says that all manufacturers, distributors and dispensers of drugs are to be registered with the Indiana Board of Pharmacy. Likewise, says 21 USC 822(a), these same manufacturers, distributors and dispensers of drugs are to be registered with the U.S. Attorney General and his D.E.A. These provisions mean that everyone who makes and sells drugs in Indiana are required to have the permission from both the Indiana pharmacy board and the D.E.A. to legally operate.
These statutes are legislative admissions that all drug manufacturers, distributors and dispensers are subject to regulators in the executive branch, and are not subject to criminal law judges in the judicial branch. This is because, as we have seen, all commerce (except for slavery) is regulated within America's states by both state and U.S. governments. Furthermore, the Separation of Powers Doctrine precludes judicial courts, with their criminal law powers, from doing the administrative work of regulators, who exercise equitable powers over commerce.
The second key feature of IC 35-48-3-3 (and its U.S. equivalent at 21 USC 822) is that both statutes recognize drug users' natural right within the state republics to be free from both regulation and criminal prosecution. These statutes at IC 35-48-3-3(e) and at 21 USC 822(c), read along with their definition sections (IC 35-48-1-27 and 21 USC 802(27)), say two major things: First, that drug users need not register with the Indiana Board of Pharmacy or the D.E.A., and second, that drug users -- who are called "ultimate users" or end users of drugs -- may “lawfully possess” drugs for their own use and the use of their households.
That drug users need not register with the pharmacy board and the D.E.A. is because property possession and private use are natural rights that are not subject to regulation within republics. As well, that drug users may “lawfully possess” drugs without being incarcerated in the criminal law jurisdiction is because only injuring others is unlawful or criminal. Thus, possession of any quantity of lawfully-acquired drugs is lawful, or non-criminal.
As we have seen, to “lawfully possess” drugs as well as the term “lawful” applies solely to natural persons in the law jurisdiction, where what is lawful and unlawful is defined by natural law. This statutory provision about what is lawful behavior does not apply to artificial persons, such as drug dealers, whose behavior is either legal or illegal.
So, this statutory provision about “lawful possession” is a reference to natural law and to its law jurisdiction, and is a codification of governments' lack of positive law authority over individual property possession. In fact, I believe that it is this very, particular natural law provision that uniquely makes all Controlled Substances Acts constitutional.
This is because the provision provides an Affirmative Defense under Trial Rule 8 to criminal defendants who are falsely charged with drug crimes. This defense is in addition to a motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)1 for want of subject matter jurisdiction. As I describe it in my first book, this Affirmative Defense is an escape hatch out of courts' fabricated (read: fraudulent) “statutory jurisdiction” and into the law jurisdiction where a defendant's individual rights may be recognized and secured.
And so, this legislative statement reiterates and codifies individuals' unalienable and pre-existing natural right to lawfully possess lawfully-acquired property, such as drugs, without going to jail, which natural rights to liberty and property are recognized at Article I, Section 1 of the 1816 Indiana constitution. That provision says that we have natural, inherent and unalienable rights not only to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, but also to acquire, to possess and to defend property. As we have learned, what is lawful and unlawful for natural persons (called individuals) is different than what is legal and illegal for artificial persons, the latter which is defined by legislatures and enforced as malum prohibita by regulators under equity.
Thus, one largely-ignored Indiana statute and one largely-ignored U.S. statute explain how both drug possession and drug commerce are to be treated within Indiana by both U.S. and Indiana drug-law enforcers. Drug possession and drug commerce are not subject to criminal law enforcers and their criminal law jurisdiction within America's state republics. In contrast, all drug commerce within the states is to be regulated by regulators and their administrative law courts in the executive branch, and this commerce is not subject to the judicial branch except in its appellate and enforcement capacities.
According to the Indiana constitution and to statutes IC 33-28-1-2 and IC 33-29-1.5-2, Indiana's judicial branch has original, subject matter jurisdiction only over civil and criminal cases, which are defined to include injury. Because manufacturing, distributing and dispensing drugs to consenting adults does not constitute injury, and because it constitutes drug commerce which is regulated, then neither Indiana nor U.S. judicial courts have or have ever had criminal jurisdiction over unwanted drug commerce.
This is consistent with the regulatory statutes that we just discussed, IC 35-48-3-3 and 21 USC 822, with the U.S. Supreme Court cases Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934) and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and with the Indiana Supreme Court in Beebe v. State, 5 Ind. 501 (1855), all of which recognizes only governments' regulatory authority over commerce within Indiana.
As we have seen, the proper treatment of unwanted drug dealing is to enjoin it. Injunction is an equitable power. Both the Indiana pharmacy board and the D.E.A. may enjoin unwanted drug dealing within Indiana. Under Indiana law, if such a state administrative order is violated, then the Indiana Attorney General, under IC 35-48-3-3(i), may seek enforcement of this administrative injunction by a judicial court.
This particular provision at IC 35-48-3-3(i) was added only a couple of years ago to the Indiana Controlled Substances Act. It is the state legislature's admission that the state's supreme authority over unwanted drug dealing is to enjoin it, using judicial contempt power, and not to prosecute it as crime. That the Indiana Attorney General may seek a judicial injunction against unwanted drug dealing under equity bespeaks that drug dealing is not subject to criminal law.
The new provision is also prima facia evidence of fraud by one or more of Indiana's statute writers, if not also its legislative leaders, who know that injunction under non-criminal equity is the state's supreme power over unwanted drug dealing, yet who watch without objection to our drug laws' false enforcement in Indiana's criminal law courts. I do not know who these people are, but they are low down and low life for doing the king's unlawful business.
The next point that I would like to make is two-fold: Point A is that all the statutes that I've discussed with you so far are arguably constitutional, because they adequately – albeit torturedly – define who has power over what drugs. However, I have shown that government officials and defense attorneys do not properly read and follow these constitutional statutes because they cannot see the statutes' inherent separations of power.
This means that these officials must a priori comprehend the republican form of government order to see these separations embodied in the statutes. My Notice and Demand is my means of demonstrating these separations in constitutional, statutory and case law, and of encouraging government officials and officers of our court to know and follow state and federal drug laws.
However, point B is this: that, although the Indiana CSA is arguably constitutional for the aforementioned reasons, nonetheless there are several drug statutes or provisions within the Indiana Code that are either unconstitutional or should be declared unenforceable.
Take, for example, the Indiana legislature's unlawful grant of authority to law enforcers to arrest people for regulatory violations, such as dealing cocaine or for not registering with the pharmacy board. This unconstitutional law is published at IC 16-42-20-1(b)(3), which is to be read in conjunction with IC 35-31.5-2-217. These provisions are unconstitutional or unenforceable because drug dealing and non-registration are, at worst, regulatory violations which, again, because of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, are not subject to criminal law and to judicial arrest authority.
Law enforcers may ticket unauthorized drug dealers for dealing drugs without state permission and for being unregistered, and may summons them to a pharmacy board or D.E.A. enforcement hearing, but law enforcers may not arrest such persons for these regulatory infractions. Thus, the legislature's unauthorized grant of power to law enforcers to arrest non-criminals at IC 16-42-20-1(b)(3), for the non-crimes listed at IC 35-31.5-2-217, is unconstitutional. The legislature does not have the power to redefine non-crimes as crimes, and thus cannot grant criminal-arrest authority to law enforcers over these regulatory matters.
As well, several statutes in the Indiana CSA are in serious conflict. As mentioned, IC 35-48-3-3 says that all who manufacture or sell drugs are to register with the Indiana pharmacy board. In conflict with this, for example, is IC 35-48-4-sections 1 through 4, which say that people who manufacture or sell certain kinds of drugs are felons.
So one statute says that drug makers are regulated in the executive branch while other statutes suggest that certain drug makers – specifically, the disfavored kind – are to be tried as criminals. This conflict should render the prohibitory statutes unenforceable, or it could render Indiana's CSA unconstitutional. In any event, it should be rewritten to best express the separations of power in our law.
The real answer (or the real law) is that all drug commerce is regulated in equity. Because of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 14th Amendment, the state of Indiana must treat all drug makers and sellers the same. Only Congress in the federal areas need not treat all drug makers, distributors and sellers the same.
As anyone can note, the statutes IC 35-48-4-sections 1 through 4 do not use the words “unlawful” or “prohibit” to place drug dealing into the criminal law jurisdiction, as the 18th Amendment did alcohol commerce. As well, IC 35-48-3-3 does not exempt or except the commerce of particular drugs from regulation.
This evidences that the legislature cannot and did not – via statute – take disfavored drug commerce out of the equity jurisdiction, and did not place it under the law jurisdiction, which holds all of the state's criminal power. To do so requires the reference to the word "unlawful" or to the police power “prohibit” in a constitutional amendment.
And so these prohibitory statutes at IC 35-48-Article 4 cannot stand together with the regulatory provisions at IC 35-48-Article 3, whether the faulty statutes are declared unenforceable or whether the CSA is declared unconstitutional as a result. Drug dealers as a class are criminal or as a class they are regulated, but under a republican form of government, which maintains a separation between what is commercial and what is criminal, they cannot be both. Drug dealers as a class may be treated differently only under the non-republican form government, such as in Great Britain or in the U.S. federal areas, where a queen or a Congress determines everyone's criminal rights and wrongs.
Legislative fraud, carried out by the judiciary
This next section is called “Legislative fraud, carried out by the judiciary.” In it I will briefly show you how Congress and state legislatures (and in particular, their statute writers) have committed fraud upon all of us, and have in fact convinced American attorneys, including judges, that both drug possession and drug businesses are unlawful, meaning criminal, when at worst they are illegal, which we now know means non-criminal yet subject to forfeiture and injunction as malum prohibita.
The fraud of statute writers and arrangers is to have willfully misrepresented law so as to cause their statutes' false enforcement, resulting in the false arrests, false prosecutions and false enslavement of countless out-of-favor people. I will use the CSAs from Indiana and Washington state to demonstrate that statute writers (if not also key legislators) have perpetrated this legislative fraud using two different discernible criminal methodologies.
In Indiana, take for example IC 35-48-4-11(a) which calls possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana a misdemeanor, IC 35-48-4-11(c) which calls possession of 30 grams or more of marijuana a felony, and IC 35-48-4-1 and 2 which call both cocaine and methamphetamine dealing felonies. Note that these statutes do not call drug possession or dealing “unlawful,” and do not claim to “prohibit” anything, as the 18th Amendment did with alcohol commerce.
As we previously discussed, 1) the words misdemeanor and felony are mentioned in and defined in context by the U.S. constitution to include injury, and 2) a legislature's use of the words misdemeanor and felony must connote the same meanings as those same words used in our constitutions, which is supreme law. The constitutional terms felony, misdemeanor, offense, crime, case, civil case, and criminal case all refer to behavior that is malum in se, or naturally bad by its injurious nature. Constitutionally speaking, and by definition, all felonies and misdemeanors, even petit (which are petite) misdemeanors, are injurious.
As previously discussed, drug possession is a natural right that its codified at IC 35-48-3-3(e) and at 21 USC 822(c), both statutes which say that drug users may “lawfully possess” drugs for their own use. These same statutes also say that all manufacturers, distributors and dispensers of drugs are to register with the pharmacy board and the D.E.A. Thus, by these two statutes alone, we know that neither drug possession nor drug dealing are criminal, as Congress and the state legislature might elsewhere suggest, because at most they are regulated activities.
As we have just noted, IC 35-48-4-1 and 2 call certain kinds of drug dealing feloni es (meaning crimes), and yet IC 35-48-3-3 says that all drug dealing is regulated. These statutes are in conflict and could – maybe should – render Indiana's CSA as unconstitutional.
However, instead, I would argue that these statutes are really just nothing-burgers. That is, these statutes that call the exercise of a natural right and the exercise of legal privileges misdemeanors or felonies have no real force and effect before judges that know the judicial meaning of misdemeanors and felonies, as well as their own courts' subject matter jurisdiction over injury. Calling either drug possession or drug dealing crime is absurd before criminal judges who know the republican meaning of crime, and who know that only Congress in the federal areas may define crime unnaturally.
Blackstone told us that “in all cases, the crime includes an injury...” Crimes are both private wrongs and offenses against the public, he tells us. The Indiana Supreme Court reiterates this in State ex rel. Johnson v. White Circuit Court, 77 NE2nd 298, 300-301 (Ind 1948), where it demonstrates that all crimes are torts. This reiterates American Jurisprudence 2nd, which says that “crime is said to be an offense against the sovereign, a wrong which the government deems injurious not only to the victim but to the public at large...”
Likewise, Article I, Section 13 of Indiana's constitution says that crime is defined by law – which we now know means by natural law – only to include victims. These statements of law are all admissions that natural law, and not some majority of legislators, defines who may be enslaved by Indiana's criminal law jurisdiction.
Thus, any criminal judge worth his or her weight in salt knows the meaning of misdemeanor, felony, offense and crime, which are all criminal cases, and can see right through these willful statutory misrepresentations of crime by the Indiana legislature. All competent judges know the distinctions between cases, crimes and infractions. Just because the legislature calls something a crime, such as reading a book or taking a walk, does not make it so.
This is because a higher authority than Man and his legislatures – that is, Nature and her immutable political laws – define right and wrong as well as the basis of criminal liability in the Indiana republic. This basis of liability is injury, and not the will of a legislature, judge or justice, parliament or would-be king.
Because republican legislatures do not have constitutional authority to invent crimes and determine the criminal jurisdiction of the judicial branch, then constitutional amendments are needed to change the meaning of crime and criminal jurisdiction. This is what the 18th Amendment did. It took the manufacture, transportation and sale of alcohol – that is, the commerce of alcohol – out of equity where it was being regulated, and it and placed this activity under law – that is, under the law jurisdiction – where such commerce could be criminally prohibited. Conversely, the 21st Amendment took unwanted alcohol commerce out of the law jurisdiction, where it was being treated as a crime, and placed this commerce back under equity, where it became regulated again.
Because law is the definition or division of power, then the amendments changed law by dividing or separating power over certain subject matter differently than before. Thus, if the listener did not know about the separations of the law jurisdiction from equity, and about the separation between the police powers of prohibition against crime and regulation of commerce, then you could not have understood the operation of the 18th and 21st Amendments. But, now you do.
The 13th and 18th Amendments took what was regulated, i.e., slavery and alcohol commerce, and placed these activities under law, where they could be criminally prohibited. In contrast, the 21st Amendment took what was once criminal, i.e., alcohol commerce, and placed it back under regulation.
Two of the main points I am making here is that the Indiana legislature may not criminalize anything without a constitutional amendment that prohibits or makes unlawful the activity, and because of this, statute writers for the Indiana legislature were careful not to prohibit or make unlawful drug possession or dealing in the Indiana CSA, so as not to obviously make its penalty provisions unconstitutional.
Instead, the authors wrote these penalty provisions to have no force and effect, just as if they had called reading a book a felony. The authors relied on police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges not knowing the distinctions between crimes and regulatory infractions, and not knowing judicial courts' jurisdiction over injurious cases, instead of commerce, to discover and decipher this trickery.
Now that I've shown you how the Indiana legislature defrauded officials and attorneys into believing that drug possession and dealing are unlawful, or criminal, just by calling them names, let me show you how other state legislatures and Congress likewise defraud officials, attorneys and the public-at-large by the wording of their statutes. Mind you, this is the same fraud as in Indiana. It is the same willful misrepresentation of law, i.e., that legislatures determine the property and liberty rights of individuals – but this fraud is one using a different willfully fraudulent technique.
Take, for example the Controlled Substances Act of Washington state, where selling marijuana is now legal, but has always been lawful, or non-criminal. With regard to drug possession, the state's revised code (RCW 69.50.4013(1)) essentially says: “It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance” without a valid prescription “or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter.” The federal drug possession statute at 21 USC 844(a) uses similar language.
Likewise, regarding drug dealing, the Washington CSA (RCW 69.50.401) reads: “Prohibited Acts: A – Penalties. Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful...” to manufacture, distribute or dispense drugs. 21 USC 841(a) uses similar language.
What we should be aware of are two things: 1) that these statutes include the words unlawful and prohibit (which Indiana's statutes do not), and 2) that because of this, these statutes at least feign criminally prohibiting drug possession and dealing “except as authorized by this chapter...”
In so many words, these Washington state statutes say that it is a crime to possess or deal drugs “except as authorized by this chapter.” So, it is our goal to determine what is otherwise “authorized by this chapter...” because those things supposedly would not be criminal. (Parenthetically, this catch-phrase “except as authorized by this chapter” is itself a fraud because it intentionally misrepresents that the Washington state legislature has power to determine what is and what is not unlawful, or criminal, which power it does not constitutionally possess.)
The expression “except as authorized by this chapter” encompasses two important exceptions to criminal liability under the Washington's Controlled Substances Act, which are both the same exceptions to criminal liability under the Indiana CSA.
The first exception to criminal liability – that is “authorized by the chapter...” – is at RCW 69.50.302(a), which is the very same provision as at IC 35-48-3-3(a) and (b). This Washington statute says that all drug dealers – all who manufacture, distribute or dispense drugs within Washington state – are to sign up and be regulated by the Washington health department. Based on the Separation of Powers Doctrine, that drug dealers are regulated by the Washington's executive branch means that, by operation of law, they are excepted or exempted from the criminal law jurisdiction in Washington's judicial branch.
The second statutory exception (at RCW 69.50.302(c)) is the same as that recognized in the Indiana Code at IC 35-48-3-3(e), which says that drug users need not register with the Washington department of health and may “lawfully possess” drugs for their own use and the use of their households. This is compatible with people's natural right to property possession as recognized at Article I, Section 3 of Washington's state constitution.
Thus, Washington statutes tell us 1) that drug possession is criminal unless one lawfully acquires and possesses them for one's own use, and 2) that drug dealing is criminal unless one is to be regulated by the executive branch, which description includes all Washington state drug dealers. Not ironically, but by design, this is the very same law as in Indiana, just written a little differently. This is because both states are republics and both have adopted a version of the same fraudulent Uniform Controlled Substances Act.
Thus in Washington state, as in Indiana, according to both states' differently-written statutes: drug possession is a lawful natural right and drug dealing is and has always been regulated, and it has never been criminal. Drug dealing has never been unlawful in the criminal law jurisdiction of Indiana or Washington state. It has merely been illegal under non-criminal equity. It has never been subject to criminal law. It has only been malum prohibita under regulation, subject to injunction.
Thus, attorneys in both Indiana and Washington have literally not known the distinctions between what is unlawful, which means tortious or criminal, and what is illegal, which means prohibited under equity, so as to defend their clients' rights during the past fifty years. As we already know, by operation of law, to be illegal does not mean to be unlawful or criminal.
This means that the judicially-waged war on drugs exists – not because of the written law, but – sorry to say – because lawyers, law enforcers and judges in Indiana and Washington state, for example, have not known the essential distinctions between what is unlawful under law and what is illegal under equity, and consequently they have not been able to read and enforce these statutes properly.
Because marijuana selling was previously illegal as malum prohibita in Washington, then the state legislature's authorization for some merchants to sell pot did not change criminal law in Washington state, but instead changed only how pot commerce was regulated. That is, the Washington state legislature did not change criminal law with regard to marijuana 1) because it changed only what is legal, which relates to commerce, and 2) because the meaning of crime and what is unlawful in Washington state did not change, and is not – and never has been – subject to the state's legislature.
So when Washington legalized pot, meaning in equity, it did not make it lawful under law, or in Washington's criminal law jurisdiction, over which the state legislature has no authority. Prior to the change, to possess and sell pot was already lawful – that is, non-criminal – under Washington's criminal law. It just wasn't legal under equity to sell it.
That it is legal today for some drug merchants to sell marijuana in Washington state means only that marijuana commerce is now regulated differently than before. Criminal law in Indiana and Washington has never changed in our lifetimes. It still takes – as it has always taken – a constitutional amendment to change one's criminal liability and courts' criminal jurisdiction in a republic such as Washington state or Indiana.
That both Hoosiers and Washingtonians have thought otherwise – for example, have thought that possessing or selling pot was criminal – is the result of them and their attorneys being tricked. That is, that they have thought pot was criminal is to be a victim of the willful misrepresentation of law by those people in-the-know within legislatures who have better known the law.
Which leads to these two main points: 1) that possession of pot – no matter what quantity – has never been criminally prohibited in Washington state or in Indiana, and 2) that pot selling may be malum prohibita or prohibited under non-criminal equity in Washington and Indiana, but it has never been malum in se, or prohibited at criminal law. In republics such as Washington and Indiana, individuals are never to be jailed as criminals for the property they lawfully possess or for the consensual businesses they operate. Only brainwashed non-republican fanatics, who have never read their state's constitutions and drug statutes, believe otherwise.
As we have learned, crime can be prescribed (that is, written down) by republican legislatures, but such legislatures do not proscribe (or prohibit) crime. This is because criminal prohibition is not within a republican legislature's authority. Within a republic, the sovereign over crime and the criminal law jurisdiction is Nature, not a legislature.
And because of this, we have seen a) that the CSAs respect the natural rights and natural jurisdiction of drug users, b) that the CSAs respect the distinctions between what is legislatively regulated under equity and what is naturally prohibited at law, i.e., real drug crimes and c) that the CSAs respect that their malum prohibita – that is, their drug prohibitions under equity – apply only to people engaged in the commerce of drugs.
And so, to believe that statutes criminally prohibit drug possession or drug dealing in either Indiana or Washington state is pure fantasy. It is the result of not reading and understanding drug statutes and the result of basing one's unprovable religious beliefs solely upon hearsay from prior faulty practitioners.
It is also the result of being tricked, defrauded and duped by statute writers, and perhaps legislative leaders, who have known the law – that is, the definition and division of power – better than rest of us, but who have allowed this good law to be misrepresented to us so as to be falsely enforced. (I devote several chapters in my first book BUSTED to the willful misrepresentation of criminal law by statute writers' and code arrangers, and to learning how to properly read their misleading statutes.)
Up until now we have been mistaken that drug possession and dealing were criminal in Indiana and in Washington state a) because we thought that our political rights, such as our rights to liberty and political equality, come from and are defined by our state legislatures and Congress, which is insane, and b) because our attorneys – including our judges – have not known the distinctions between what is unlawful and what is illegal, between what is criminally prohibited and what is regulated, between what is a crime and what is a commercial infraction, and between what is wrong by Nature at law and what is prohibited by Man under equity, so as to be able to see through the fraud perpetrated by legislation writers.
These writers are scribes for kings, not for We the People. They exist to unnaturally steal power from the People. They know in the Indiana and Washington republics that positive law is to be tempered by the natural law jurisdiction of the individual and that commerce operates in equity, and not criminal law, so they have intentionally misrepresented the law to gullible government officials and criminal attorneys, who were unqualified to see through this fraud.
Again, for example, at IC 35-48-Article 4, legislative writers misrepresented both drug possession and drug dealing as crimes. In conflict with this, at IC 35-48-Article 3, these same writers tell us that drug dealing is regulated and that drug users may lawfully possess drugs for their own use. Likewise, at IC 35-48-3-3(i), the state legislature recently re-admitted that disfavored drug dealers are subject to equity and that enjoining them – as opposed to prosecuting them – is the state's ultimate power against disfavored drug dealing.
Thus, these admissions make it clear that at least one or more of Indiana's legislative writers, if not also legislative leaders, 1) know what drug statutes really say and mean, i.e., that drug possession is lawful and that disfavored drug dealing is only illegal, which we now know means to be regulated as malum prohibita under non-criminal equity, and 2) know that these statutes are being falsely enforced in Indiana's criminal law courts, as I have come to know.
That is, someone or some people other than just moi have known – all along – that the state's administrative drug laws are being falsely enforced as criminal law, in contradiction to the state constitution. I discovered these contradictions and this fraud solely by legal analysis, but the false enforcement of our drug laws was always these criminals' design. These criminal authoritarians ultimately succeeded by training and employing attorneys who do not understand the republican form of government and who are incapable of seeing its various separations of power.
It is because drug statutes separate natural rights and duties from positive law (or legal) rights and duties that they are arguably constitutional. It is also because they respect the natural right of individuals to possess drugs and the legal right of drug dealers to equal administrative due process, just like pharmaceutical companies get. However, in neither Washington, D.C, in Washington state nor in Indiana have officials and drug defense attorneys been able to read these statutes correctly in order to properly see these distinctions and to enforce the law so as to secure these natural and artificial rights.
This is 1) because they have not known the separations of power between equity and criminal law, between what is illegal and unlawful, between malum prohibita and malum in se, and between regulation and criminal prohibition, and 2) as I just showed you, the statutes in both states were intentionally written to misrepresent the law to gullible officials and attorneys who have been incapable of seeing law's rightful separations.
That description of attorneys included me up until about four years ago when I discerned the republican form of government. What is sorta' remarkable is that I discerned this natural inherent form of government from reading and rereading drug statutes, which by-the-way are strewn in five different titles of the Indiana Code. Eventually their contradictions, obfuscations and anomalies caused me to discern and to finally understand the republican form of government's two police powers – regulation and prohibition – which these writers and code arrangers were seeking to fudge.
One of their fudge jobs is at IC 35-48-Article 4 where they placed actual drug crimes, such as cutting or contaminating drugs or misrepresenting one drug for another, side-by-side with regulatory violations, such as unlicensed cocaine dealing and failing to register with the pharmacy board. They did this so judges and other attorneys would think that every behavior listed in Article 4 is a crime, when instead the article includes 1) exercises of natural rights, such as drug possession, 2) exercises of legal rights, such as drug dealing, and 3) actual crimes. So they fudged all of this distinctions, hoping we'd think that everything list in Article 4 is criminal.
Another fudge job (read: fraud) of statute writers and code arrangers is evident at IC 16-42-20-1(b), where they have co-mingled the state's regulatory powers over drugs, such as the power to inspect drug manufacturing sites, with its criminal powers over drug crimes, such as the power to arrest drug criminals, so that government officials and attorneys would not, and thus have not, distinguished these powers.
To fudge the distinctions between the equity and law jurisdictions, to blur the roles of the executive and judicial branches, to smear the distinctions between what is regulated and what is prohibited, and to obscure who is sovereign over what was all by intent and design. One cannot read the deliberate chaos of the Controlled Substances Acts without discerning mal intent.
This same fraudulent design is also self-evident in Title 9 – Indiana's Traffic Code. It ill-defines the powers of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, so that the Indiana Attorney General can fraudulently induce judicial judges to adjudicate traffic infractions.
So, very, very ironically, it was the actual written fraud of statute writers and code arrangers which forced me to see the separations of power that they did not want me to see. It was their co-mingling of regulatory violations with crimes and their co-mingling of regulatory powers with criminal powers, that caused me to see the differences in these powers, which is essential 1) to reading the Controlled Substances Acts, and 2) to understanding America's republican form of government. Thus, these agents of fraud taught me law, i.e., the definition and division of power, that I did not learn in law school.
From this I realized that this guild of writers and code arrangers is likely America's only and last repository of attorneys who understood the republican form of government (because they essentially taught it to me), but that this guild's purpose is not to share the law and the love, so-to-speak, but to install and maintain a fraudulent and unlawful – meaning criminal – non-republic form of government within America's fifty states. This intent is actuated in the near-universal false enforcement of regulatory malum prohibita, such as disfavored drug, gun and sex commerce, as criminal malum in se.
Thus, both the Indiana and Washington state legislatures, through the enactment of their respective Controlled Substances Acts, defrauded their state's executive and judicial branches, as well as their state's citizens, who had no one with the motivation or ability to read, comprehend and properly enforce these statutes. That listeners have heretofore thought that the exercise of natural rights and commercial privileges are criminal in Indiana or in Washington state bespeaks the level and success of the criminal fraud that has been perpetrated against all of us.
Essentially, we have all been defrauded of our rights by a criminal guild of superior attorneys who wrote drug statutes so that others, including actual judges, would neither read them completely nor understand them, and would enforce them falsely. I say criminal because there is no reason to write and arrange statutes as these persons did except to willfully confuse readers and blur jurisdictions, which is malum in se or wrong by Nature in a republic.
Although, as we have just seen, both states' drug provisions are fraudulent, because they willfully misrepresent law, neither of the state's provisions is particularly unconstitutional. The provisions are arguably constitutional because they except or exempt the natural right of drug users to possess drugs and because they respect the legal right of drug dealers to administrative due process. As well, Indiana's penalty provisions, which call drug possession and dealing felonies, are not really unconstitutional either – that is, before competent judges – because these prohibitory statutes have no real force and effect.
Nonetheless, one could appropriately argue that both the Indiana and Washington CSAs are not only fraudulent but also unconstitutional 1) because they both regulate and claim to criminally prohibit drug dealing, which powers are in conflict, and 2) because they treat favored and disfavored drug dealers differently, in violation of the 13th and 14th Amendments. In any event, the fraudulently written – and conflicted – CSAs require rewriting so as to clarify all separations of power, at least for people who presently cannot read them properly.
End of part 5.