Audio Presentation Part 6:
Why this method? And our natural right to produce.
Hi, this is Kurt St. Angelo. Welcome to part 6.
I have one more substantive law point to make, which I will do nearer the end of this video. But before I do, I would like to discuss a matter of procedure with you. It stems from the logical question that I would raise as a listener, which is: Kurt, if what you say is true – that judicial courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over drug dealing because it is a regulated activity, then why are you talking to us? Why don't you just litigate this issue in a court by moving to dismiss regulatory matters in judicial courts?
And the answer is: I have. I spent an entire year of my 62-year life, and thousands of my own dollars in court fees and professional printing costs, trying to litigate this matter in good faith, which is more than I can say about the other side. In 2011 and 2012, I challenged the authority of Indiana's judicial courts to adjudicate regulatory matters, in the form of traffic infractions, which challenge I brought all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. You can read the Case Materials on this website.
The issue of whether or not a judicial court has jurisdiction over unwanted drug dealing is the very same issue as whether a judicial court has jurisdiction over one's driving too fast. They don't. Both drug dealing and driving are regulated activities, albeit by separate agencies, and both unwanted kinds of drug dealing and unwanted kinds of driving are malum prohibita. As such, as a matter of law, they are both subject to adjudication in non-criminal administrative law courts, not in judicial courts.
So when I received a speeding ticket in southern Indiana in 2010, and was summoned to the Martin County Circuit Court, which is a judicial court instead of an administrative law court in the executive branch, then I challenged the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction over my traffic infraction. I did this solely because challenging this court's lack of power over this regulatory violation was the perfect and analogous way to test the false judicial enforcement of another regulatory violation – i.e., unwanted drug dealing. That's the only reason I did it.
For background purposes, know that the Indiana legislature has created administrative law courts under the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, just as it created administrative law courts under the Indiana pharmacy board. The legislature also created a fill-in-the-blank ticket form for traffic violators. But instead of telling drivers to show up at the Commissioner's administrative law courts to have their speeding tickets adjudicated, the Indiana Attorney General instead causes the name of a judicial court to be inserted onto the printed form, in my case the Martin Circuit Court.
This act by the Attorney General is a misrepresentation of judicial courts' subject matter jurisdiction over regulatory violations and a misrepresentation of the correct process, which is administrative due process, that is owed to licensed drivers. This misrepresentation of law became willful in my case when in 2010, shortly after receiving my traffic ticket, I informed both then Indiana Attorney General Greg Zoeller and then Governor Mitch Daniels by letter that both Indiana's drug and traffic codes were being falsely enforced, which false practice continues today.
Upon the Martin Circuit Court's denial of my motion to dismiss my traffic-ticket matter, I appealed this denial to the Indiana Court of Appeals, which published a memorandum decision upholding the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. Not only did this one-paragraph decision not address any of the substantive issues in my challenge, and not only did it libel my argument and legal skills as “without merit,” but the decision was itself baseless (that is, frivolous or meritless) for two separate reasons.
First, the decision was meritless because it violated logic and reason (that is, natural cognitive law). Because jurisprudence is a natural science, it cannot ignore or violate natural law in any way... particularly logic.
In that the three statutes which the Court of Appeals cited for the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction (IC 33-33-51-1(b), IC 33-28-3-2(b), and IC 33-28-3-8(a)) did not mention either primary, original or subject matter jurisdiction over infractions, then logically these three statutes could not have granted or conveyed this power. Analysis shows that these statutes are instead about placing administrative law matters onto a court's appellate docket, not about granting judicial subject matter jurisdiction over infractions, which the legislature cannot do without changing Indiana's constitution.
And second, the memorandum decision was baseless because it equates infractions with judicial cases. IC 33-28-1-2 requires a civil or criminal case for anyone, including a prosecutor, to invoke a Circuit Court's jurisdiction. Cases are judicial matters, defined by injury. Infractions are regulatory matters, defined by a legislature or its agencies.
So, instead of being judicial cases, based on injury, infractions are regulatory violations. Instead of being malum in se, they are malum prohibita that are created and defined by legislatures or their rule-making agencies. These artificial prohibitions are to be adjudicated under regulation in administrative law courts in the executive branch – not by courts in the judicial branch.
In contrast, as we have learned, cases – including criminal cases – are not defined by legislatures, but are instead facts of Nature, defined by natural law as malum in se to include injury, and to be adjudicated by the judicial branch. In other words, infractions are not cases.
The difference between infractions and cases is fundamental law. To not know the difference is to not be qualified to be a judicial officer. It is to be unaware of the separation between the natural law jurisdiction of Indiana's constitution, which defines case and crime, and the positive law jurisdiction granted to the legislature, which defines infractions.
Thus for all Indiana judges and justices in my matter to equate regulatory infractions with judicial cases was to misrepresent the law to the citizens of Indiana. This misrepresentation was either unintentional or intentional. Logically, there are no other explanations for this non-judicial behavior.
I say non-judicial because judicial courts are not allowed to equate infractions with cases because they do not have subject matter jurisdiction over infractions. This would be to violate the Separation of Powers doctrine by equating the power of the judicial branch with a power of the executive branch.
So in my traffic infraction appeal, either the justices did not know the differences between infractions and cases, which I repeatedly pointed out to them in my briefs, or they knew the difference, but for non-judicial – that is, for political reasons, i.e., so as not to rock the boat – they disregarded these differences.
To understand just how morally and legally baseless that the Court of Appeals' memorandum decision is – please recognize the fact that it does not bar me or anyone else – under the doctrines of res judicata or stare decisis – from re-litigating the very same issue before the very same trial and appellate courts based on the very same arguments. That is, because the decision did not adjudicate the jurisdictional issues that I raised on their merits, then by the court's own admission, its memorandum opinion has no future effect on any other judicial court or upon any litigant, including me.
That's how baseless the ruling was. It was a violation of my due process rights in and of itself. I spent a year of my time and thousands of dollars, and all I got was a memorandum decision that could fit on a lousy t-shirt. I shoulda asked for my money back.
So unless these justices unanimously made a mistake, by actually equating regulatory infractions with judicial cases, which would amount to judicial incompetence, then instead, it was their intent to obstruct and delay justice by suppressing my jurisdictional challenge.
The first job of all judicial courts is to determine their subject matter jurisdiction, which was the only issue I raised. By refusing to do their job, these courts deprived Hoosiers of their right to know in which branch of government their traffic infractions are to be adjudicated. That issue still sits under the rugs in their offices, where they swept it.
But even more egregious than the courts' refusal to address this mandatory subject matter jurisdiction issue is that the Indiana Attorney General did not even respond to, let alone try to refute, the last three briefs that I wrote respectively to the Indiana Court of Appeals, to the Indiana Supreme Court and to the U.S. Supreme Court. Can you imagine a state Attorney General not responding to a three-part argument – to the highest courts in the state and in the land – that showed that his office was falsely enforcing traffic statutes by fraudulently inducing defendants into the wrong courts, in the wrong branch of government, just as the war on drugs is doing?
The reason that former Attorney General Greg Zoeller's office did not answer my last three briefs is because state attorneys did not have anything with which to answer. They had no answers for my assertions 1) that the Circuit Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over my traffic infraction, which is not a case, 2) that the administrative law courts of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles had primary jurisdiction to adjudicate traffic infractions, and 3) that my right as a regulated driver to administrative due process under the 14th Amendment (i.e., to be treated administratively and not judicially) was being violated.
These are the very same demurrers that defendants coulda, shoulda, woulda raised against alleged criminal drug dealing charges during the past fifty years. Neither drug dealing nor driving too fast is criminal or judicial. Both drug dealing and driving are regulated in the executive branch.
The point of my traffic litigation was to demonstrate that prosecutors have no and have never had either any constitutional or any statutory authority to bring regulatory violations into judicial courts. If the state of Indiana had such power, then the Attorney General and the Court of Appeals would have offered at least one relevant statute and some case law to prove it.
But folks, there isn't any. Whether for a traffic infraction or a drug infraction, the only relevant jurisdictional statutes for Indiana's Circuit and Superior Courts respectively are IC 33-28-1-2 and IC 33-29-1-1.5. Both of these statutes require a civil or criminal case based on injury to invoke either a civil or criminal court's jurisdiction. According to the Separation of Powers Doctrine – judicial courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over regulatory violations, whether they be driving a motor vehicle without a license or making and selling drugs without a license.
In part 5 of this audio presentation, we discussed legislative fraud. One of the statutes cited by the Court of Appeals, i.e., IC 33-28-3-8(a), is an example of legislative fraud. It says that courts' "minor offenses and violations docket has jurisdiction over... All infraction cases."
The problem with this sentence is that there is no such thing as an "infraction case." In fact, the term is an oxymoron. Infractions (which are legislatively defined) are different than cases (which are naturally defined by injury).
Infractions are to be dealt with under administrative law in the executive branch. Cases are to be dealt with by civil or criminal law in the judicial branch. The term "infraction case" is a willful legislative misrepresentation of law, i.e. fraud, intended to be relied upon by judicial officers who can be easily fooled.
So, all the Indiana courts in my infraction matter (psst, it wasn't a case) quite literally relied upon legislative fraud, and thereby blew off 1) motor vehicle drivers' rights to administrative due process under the 14th Amendment, and 2) litigants' and citizens' substantive right to a judicial decision on the merits regarding THE most fundamental and primary judicial issue under republican law – subject matter jurisdiction.
The courts refused to address the issue of jurisdiction because no one wanted to admit that the state had been enforcing the Traffic Code improperly, since probably 1920. My assertions opposed their unprovable non-republican religion that the Indiana legislature is sovereign over Indiana's judicial branch, and that the judicial branch serves the state legislature instead of the People. In doing so, these judges and justices sold-out their branch of government and merged it with the legislative branch, just as if they were serving the King back in jolly-'ole England or a corrupt Jim Crow legislature.
But far worse than just acting like pawns of a King, our state's judges and justices covered up wrongdoing. When I alleged that the Indiana Attorney General was inducing traffic defendants into the wrong courts with misrepresentations on state traffic tickets, then all of the judges and justices involved in this matter had an obligation to investigate or cause the investigation of these misrepresentations.
So, Indiana's judicial system became political and absolutely broke down during my good faith attempt to expose its misuse, which same argument is directly applicable to its illegal war on drugs. If the judges and justices had merely done their jobs back in 2011 and 2012, by protecting the integrity of their courts instead of participating in the Attorney General's fraudulent-highway robbery scheme, under false color of law, then the false enforcement of both our traffic and drug statutes could be well behind us by now.
So now you know why I won't be challenging the false enforcement of our drug laws in the same futile manner, using the very same correct arguments, before Indiana's unlawful and detestable private justice regime, but have instead directly contacted various legislative, executive and judicial officers (as well as the news media) so as to put them all (and essentially everyone) on notice of that drug statutes are uniformly falsely enforced. All of my materials are intended to make sure that government officials will never again bury their corruption in a law book.
In the event that my efforts do not result in the abrupt end to the judicially-waged war on drugs (as well as the false enforcement of traffic laws) within Indiana, and elsewhere, then I hope that my Notice and Demand and this presentation are effective ways 1) to encourage jurisdictional challenges by defense attorneys to all false drug (and traffic) prosecutions, 2) to encourage civil rights lawsuits against fraudulent state actions under false color of law, and 3) to encourage lawsuits for legal malpractice and neglect by drug (and traffic) defense attorneys, which may continue to occur within America's judicial courts.
All defenses and all causes of action for false drug enforcement in Indiana are based on three facts: 1) that drug possession is a natural right under Indiana's constitution (as codified by statute at IC 35-48-3-3(e) and at 21 USC 822(c)), 2) that drug commerce is subject to regulation (pursuant to IC 35-48-3-3(a) and (b) and 21 USC 822(a)), and 3) that neither drug possession nor drug dealing amount to cases that are subject to judicial process within the Indiana republic (as required by IC 33-28-1-2 and IC 33-29-1-1.5).
That regulatory matters are enforced as actual cases or crimes within America's judicial courts represents a total breakdown in America's adversarial judicial process, as well as in America's legal education system.
Difference between production and manufacture
Given all this new knowledge for you, and given that I do not wish to address anyone again on this subject, I am going to make one additional statutory point before concluding. This is to point out the statutory distinction between production and manufacturing, which is really part of the separation between law and equity and between the natural law jurisdiction of individuals and the positive law authority of government. It will be a good, representative topic on which to end this long substantive meaningful talk.
Production is one of the means by which individuals lawfully acquire property. Individuals can produce certain things for themselves, including certain drugs, without consenting to governments' equity jurisdiction over commerce. That is, they can produce certain drugs without invoking a police power.
The police power of regulation applies to the manufacturing of drugs, but not to all production of drugs. As we have seen at IC 35-48-3-3, the regulatory power of Indiana is over the manufacture, distribution and dispensing of drugs. To manufacture and to produce drugs are different natural and statutory concepts. They are distinguished in the definition section of the Indiana CSA at IC 35-48-Chapter 1.
There, at IC 35-48-1-18, drug manufacturing is defined as deriving a drug from a natural source. This means that producing a natural source of drugs – such as growing marijuana or poppies – is not manufacturing, and is not per se regulated. However growing marijuana and poppies can be subject to regulation if what is naturally produced a) is grown so as to be distributed or dispensed to the public, or b) is manufactured into something else, such as hashish is derived from marijuana or a heroin is derived from poppies.
Ultimately, manufacturing is a subset of production. All things manufactured are produced, but not all things produced are manufactured. For example, to grow marijuana or coca is to produce those plants, but not to manufacture them. As well, one can grow such plants without any intent to distribute or dispense those plants to other people.
Thus, one may lawfully grow any kind of natural plant for oneself without manufacturing them, and without being subject to food or drug regulators or criminal law enforcers. Only plants grown for distribution to the public, or only things derived or manufactured from these plants, are subject to governments' regulation over commerce.
This means that all manufacturing is regulated, such as the making of cocaine from coca, but not all production is regulated, for example growing coca for one's own consumption. Another way of saying this is: that all drug manufacturing is regulated, but the personal production of natural psychotropic drugs is not. Merely growing natural drugs for oneself is to lawfully acquire those things, which is to “lawfully possess” those drugs, which possession – says IC 35-48-3-3(e) – is not subject to regulation or incarceration.
This is because to naturally produce things for oneself, such as growing tomatoes or marijuana in a personal garden, is a natural right within a republic, which is outside of the legislature's regulatory jurisdiction over commerce. By definition, personal gardening is a natural right in a republic because it is not subject to either republican police power: prohibition or regulation.
In contrast, personal gardening is a legal right granted by Congress in the federal areas, where drug possession is legal. Thus, our nonviolent gardening does not invoke a police power anywhere within the United States – where producing natural drugs for oneself is either lawful or legal.
Compare this to making wine or beer in one's home, which practice constitutes manufacturing. Because of this, home beer- and wine-making are subject to Indiana's alcohol regulators. However to maintain people's privacy, so that alcohol regulators do not have the power to inspect people's homes when they suspect homeowners are making making beer or wine, the state legislature exempts certain amounts of home production of wine and beer from regulatory control.
However, unlike the making of beer and wine, the growing or producing of cannabis, poppy, psilocybin, coca, peyote and kat, for example, require no manufacturing. These natural plants are naturally exempt from the malum prohibita of regulators because of the separation of individuals' natural law jurisdiction over production from the legislature's positive law jurisdiction over manufacturing.
This separation manifests in the statutory distinction between production and manufacturing. Republican legislatures are sovereign over man-made things and over the commerce of all things, but have no authority over Nature's creations, such as you and me, or the plants and fungi we grow for ourselves.
So, unlike home wine and beer makers, who manufacture wine and beer and who are by definition subject to government's equity jurisdiction, producers of natural plants and fungi in home gardens are not. Thus, there is no need to be statutorily exempted from regulatory control, as are home wine- and beer-manufacturers. Growing anything solely for oneself or one's own household is to produce that something naturally, outside of regulatory authority.
This is because of the separation of what belongs to individuals under natural law, i.e. what they produce from Mother Earth for themselves, and what belongs to government under positive law, e.g., that which people manufacture or that which they distribute to the public. Statutes make these separations of power adequately clear for the few people like me who have taken the time to properly read and understand them.
So, the final point is that one has a natural right in a republic to grow cannabis, poppy, psilocybin, coca, peyote and kat, for example, as one has a natural right to grow tomatoes. However, if one takes this “produce” that one “produces,” and either a) one derives or manufactures something from it, such as deriving hashish from the marijuana or cocaine from coca, which constitutes manufacturing, or b) one takes their “produce” and sells it the public, then that person is subject to regulation.
So, all sellers of malum prohibita drugs are subject to being shut down by the Indiana pharmacy board and the D.E.A., but not necessarily all producers of malum prohibita drugs are subject to regulation. Many producers of drugs may be doing it as a natural right, for their own consumption, instead as a regulated legal right for consumption by others.
Republican drug statutes recognize our natural right to produce natural drugs and our legal right to manufacture and distribute them, which is subject to legislatures. Otherwise, these statutes would not be constitutional.
Because all drug manufacturers and sellers in Indiana are regulated, then all are required to register with the Indiana pharmacy board and the D.E.A. Once these makers and sellers of drugs register with these agencies, then their growing or distribution operations are subject to the equitable powers of inspection, confiscation, injunction and specific performance by these agencies.
This is because selling malum prohibita is illegal. However, because of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, these growers are not personally subject to the police powers of criminal prohibition and prosecution within the judicial branch because their behavior is lawful.
Thus, the pharmacy board and the D.E.A. have jurisdiction over the manufacture, distribution and dispensing of all drugs in Indiana, but they have no regulatory, equitable authority over the non-commercial production of living things, such as plants and mushrooms, which are produced for one's own consumption or for the consumption by one's household.
Regulators may regulate the sale and distribution of commercial produce, but not the products of home gardening that are not distributed to the public. Only Congress, when legislating over the federal areas, where natural rights are not respected and where the law jurisdiction does not exist, has any authority over its subjects' personal gardens.
Thus, within Indiana and other states, Man's positive law has no jurisdiction over naturally growing things, such as plants or mushrooms, that people produce for their own use and the use of their households, but positive law does have regulatory authority over such naturally growing things that people produce with the intent to distribute. Again, this is because of the initial separation of power that we mentioned: that between the power of Man's positive law, which applies to certain things such as commerce and foreigners, and the power of natural law, which individuals have constitutionally reserved.
Whether we are discussing one's growing of coca or one's growing of tomatoes, only when people produce living things with the intent to distribute or dispense this produce, or only when they manufacture things from natural sources, do they consent to be governed under equity and become subject to regulation. Otherwise, they are naturally free of their governments' delegated police powers.
This is all because of the various separations of power that operate in our republican law: the separations between natural and positive law, between the law and equity jurisdictions, between the police powers of criminal prohibition and regulation, between malum in se that is unlawful and malum prohibita that is illegal, between what is commerce and what is crime, between the reserved natural rights of individuals and the granted powers of government, and between the republican powers of Congress within the states and its non-republican powers in the federal areas, all separations of which have been fudged and mingled (or mangled) for the past fifty years of the unlawful war on drugs. As we have seen, the judicially-waged war on drugs violates not only these separations of power in our constitutions, but also the 13th and 14th Amendments. That's a lot of lawbreaking.
As we have learned, republican governments have no criminal authority over private drug possession or drug dealing. They have power to arrest and try only the unlawful, not the illegal, and only for what is criminal, not what is just commercial. They regulate what is commercial under equity. They prohibit what is criminal under law.
The fraudulent war on drugs exists because government officials and drug defense attorneys have not kept these concepts, and the jurisdictions in which they operate, separate. Because governments' proper separations of power are now made clear to the professionals, then personal liability for their future wrongdoing begins today.
In conclusion, my Notice and Demand, my law books, and this audio presentation 1) put various government officials, drug defense attorneys and news organizations on notice that Indiana and U.S. government officials have been falsely representing and enforcing Indiana and U.S. drug statutes, and in the process have thereby injured millions of people in Indiana by intimidating them and by depriving them of their natural rights, and 2) my Notice and Demand insists that these persons stop their harmful practices under their false color of law.
My Notice and Demand has been publicly recorded so as to facilitate proof of these persons' future willful violations of Indiana and U.S. drug law, the damages for which they should be held personally, indeed criminally, liable. Its intent is not to shame anyone for their oversights, but to cause them to choose to do the right thing.
If anyone wishes to contact me, please do so through my email at kurtsaintangelo@gmail.com.
I encourage you to listen to this 6-part presentation again, and to share it with all family, friends and public officials. Needless to say, all U.S. citizens have been deprived of this uniquely American information by authoritarians in our governments.
As well, I encourage you to read my law books. Of the two, America's Republican Form of Government is the latest, cheapest, shortest, easiest to read and likely the most useful to U.S. citizens. At $9.95, it is the best legal education that money can buy under $100,000. The book shows that as citizens we have all been defrauded by political authoritarians who, with the help of misguided legal professionals, have succeeded in depriving us of our republican form of government.
Thank you for listening. The fate of the state of government is in your hands. Let's end the fraudulent war on drugs, get rid of bad lawyering, improve our legal, political and civic education, hold accountable all people who have been profiting from their misuse of our criminal justice system, and restore our republican form of government. With our newfound knowledge and political morality, this is a perfect day to start.